Football Garden

Die by Your Own Ideas

Where would U.S. Soccer be if Sean Johnson got a little more of his hand on the ball? Or if one of the referees had seen Terrence Boyd get struck in the face? Or if Bill Hamid hadn’t rolled his ankle stepping out to snag a fairly routine cross?

I submit to you that if any of these situations, these instantaneous details, had turned out differently, the narrative depictions of the U-23 team’s group stage performance and its reflection of U.S. Soccer’s development would be telling a far different story. Remember the 180 degree turn in narrative and analysis after the Senior National Team scored a scrappy extra time goal to go from group stage failures to winners? In this unfair game and unfair world, lucky breaks and instantaneous details can shift fortunes and perceptions of quality in logarithmic fashion.

I applaud Caleb Porter for approaching this tournament the way he did. He was unapologetic in his choice to play a system and instill a philosophy, which many argue is “inappropriate” for American bred players. As a whole, the system did what it was supposed to do: dictate the tempo and rhythm of the game and create goal scoring opportunities.

Yes, he made mistakes. Primarily, several of his player selections proved detrimental to the system and style of play he was seeking to implement.

What should not be overlooked is that all three group stage games, the majority of the game took place in Cuba, Canada, and El Salvador’s defensive halves and the U.S. systematically created goal scoring opportunities during open play against teams that were organized effectively to counter the U.S.’s attacking system. 

The latter is no easy feat. The goals that the U-23’s scored were of the variety of which the U.S. Soccer community has coveted for years. Boyd’s opening goal against ES was the result of concerted U.S. pressure deep in El Salvador’s half. Joe Corona’s goal against El Salvador was the result of a multi-pass sequence that started from the back and quickly circulated through the U.S. lines to Adu who played a technical chip to Corona for the back post header.

Even against Canada, whose intensity and devotion to getting numbers behind the ball was staggering throughout the game, multi-pass sequences resulted in clear second half opportunities for Shea and Adu 8-12 yards in front of Canada’s goal. One, if not both, of those opportunities should have been converted.

That was the good. Of course, there was also plenty that could have been improved. The issue of player selection has been rightly raised as an area where Porter’s approach was flawed. For every Brek Shea 1 v. 3 that led to a turnover or the extra seconds it took Ike Opara to control a simple pass the plot slipped away from dominance towards uncertainty and heartbreak for the U-23s.

Many post mortems have pinned the blame for such flawed inclusions on the hackiness and structure of the youth development system. Others have claimed that a sense of entitlement for those lucky enough to navigate the U.S. Soccer mousetrap caused a systemic lack of grit and competitiveness.

If anything, these are symptoms that dance around the root cause.

If a possession based, dominant system is our goal (which I believe it should be) then we have to go “all in” selecting and developing players to meet the demands of such a system. There is a reluctance to abandon the idea that superior athleticism, largely defined by size and speed, will be a necessary ingredient for progression of U.S. Soccer. Even Porter, who’s philosophy and vision is historically superior to any recent U.S. coach, seems to have relied on the perceived safety of the “athletic” status quo to make some of his roster selections. It’s not Porter’s fault that Opara and Shea and others in their mold have been promoted through the ranks of U.S. Soccer despite their obvious flaws and incomplete skill sets. However, he is certainly accountable for their inclusion on the U-23 roster and for the prominent roles they played during the tournament. 

As we saw with the U-23s, there’s no place to hide your gigantic centerback with a poor first touch or one dimensional winger that coughs up the ball under pressure when you’re plan is to dominate possession and establish the rhythm of the game. Centerbacks and wingers must possess the skill and intellect to effectively maintain possession and recognize trouble spots before they happen. Raw athletic factors are useless unless the foundation (technique and brains! as Gary says) is in place. 

It all goes back to the craft, the details, and the sophistication of the game at the highest international levels. Make no mistake, CONCACAF “minnows” like Canada and El Salvador have the same unlimited access to footballing information the internet and modern media provide. They too are seeking to improve the quality of their football using every resource at their disposal. We are never going to have a place to hide our “athletes” on the field when our rivals and benchmark nations are improving at producing intelligent and skillful footballers at the highest levels, at every position.

The advantage we can gain over our rivals is by failing fast by learning every possible detail from where things have gone wrong and refining our methods accordingly. I’ve borrowed the title phrase of this piece “Die by your own ideas” from a quote by Johann Cruyff. The essence of the quote (at least how I interpret it) is that progress and ultimate success is best achieved by choosing a philosophy/set of ideals and constantly testing and refining those ideals to build a better system and seek better results. Failure provides significant opportunities for learning, growth, and reflection for those patient and reasonable enough to reflect and analyze the true causes of such failures.

Caleb Porter brought an overall philosophy shared by the world’s dominant footballing teams. His ownership of and advocacy for the team’s playing style sets him apart from other U.S. coaches defined by unidentifiable tactics and gravitation towards status quo. Unfortunately, I include Klinsmann in the latter group.

We can learn from the failures if we commit to the long-term buildup of the footballing craft in the U.S. That starts with recognizing how unsophisticated player selection can cause a well-intentioned system and philosophy to come unglued.

 Additional thoughts:

• Okugo should have played a far more influential role throughout the tournament, possibly as a replacement for Opara. His passing was the cleanest and quickest of any U.S. player.
• 3-4-3 would have been the logical formation adjustment against Canada’s defensive numbers bringing Gyau onto the RW and moving Adu into the #10 role below the center forward, taking out Villafana rather than Corona.
• For all the talk about the defensive failings against El Salvador, Boyd should have scored at least one more goal in the first 15-20 minutes. He missed a point blank header, lost a breakaway on a bad touch, and tried to do a weird chest shot thing after being played through by Adu. Had Boyd score any of these, El Salvador might have fallen apart and the game could have been decided far earlier.  

Halos over Bilbao

None of Atheltic Bilbao’s starters yesterday came to Bilbao as a result of a blockbuster summer transfer prior to this season. Most of them are under the age of 25 and came into the first team through Bilbao’s youth development system. All of the players are of Basque heritage.

Bielsa, Llorente, Munian, Martinez are names that will likely be on the tips of manager’s and pundit’s tongues as must have transfer targets for the “big” European clubs. Same with Tello, Cuenca, Samper and Dongou. While the Bilbao’s and Barcelona’s of the world patiently groom their next class of competent footballers to form the core of their teams, those clubs without such solid foundations will flail into the transfer market looking to poach the fruits of more confident, patient, and prescient clubs.

Bielsa’s future may be the most interesting. “El Loco’s” career moves over the years suggest that his footballing motivation is not fueled by striving to coach the club with the most prestige and access to the transfer market or that offers the biggest paycheck. His decision last summer to pass on the Inter Milan position in favor his current Bilbao post is evidence of what makes Bielsa tick.

When Bielsa joined Bilbao, he didn’t demand big name transfers. Bilbao’s historical football DNA—young, hard-working, devoted to youth development—was perfect for Bielsa’s philosophy and tactics, despite the fact that Bilbao historically used direct tactics oriented towards service to the tall and technical striker Fernando Llorrente. Bielsa needs guys that are willing to keep an open mind and adapt and buy-in to his system and philosophy. Young, hard working players that are willing to learn and execute their roles within the system fit within the sum greater than parts philosophy and system Bielsa implements.

The core of Bilbao’s team was in place prior to Bielsa’s arrival. However, Bielsa’s system and the successful and visible results it has produced will likely shoot Bilbao’s profile into the stratosphere. The metaphorical halos around Bielsa and many of the Bilbao players will inevitably form and catch the eye of players, owners, and coaches throughout world football.

I’m referring to the “Halo Effect.” The Halo Effect is sort of a catch all description of a human cognitive bias whereby an outside observer associates positive attributes or “goodness” with someone or something due to a easily observable appealing attribute of that person, thing or business.

The easiest and most common example of the Halo Effect is associating additional positive attributes (good judgment, reasoning etc…) due to a person’s physical attractiveness i.e. so and so “just looks like a good President/leader.” In business, the Halo Effect has been observed when analysts celebrate short term profitability or results of a company and proclaim it’s exemplary leadership/structure/marketing but fail to recognize less visible and more nuanced factors that lead to long term results and sometimes decline.

The Halo Effect is a major factor in football analysis, particularly within the U.S.

The most obvious example of this are single game results and goal scoring. Results and individual goals scored are the most visible and easily quantifiable metrics within the game. They are also the easiest way for mediocre players and teams to create a halo of quality that covers up technical flaws and structural insufficiencies.

I believe the Halo Effect has been historically influential in player selection for our National Team and potential MLS signings, particularly with regards to European vs. Domestic/Mexican club status of players. European leagues are painted with a broad brush when it comes to assumptions of quality. There can be a flawed lack of differentiation when making an assessment of quality between La Liga, Serie A, or the Bundesliga and Scandinavian or Mediterranean leagues. Simply because a player is playing in Denmark or Greece does not mean that they are exposed to higher level of quality than domestic players.

The biggest elephant in the room on this topic is the Premier League. The salaries and exposure of the English Premier League are among the world’s best. Yet quality within the league is inferior and waning with huge disparities in technical and coaching quality being revealed regularly at the international and European levels. One look at the state of the FA and the England coaching situation should give immediate pause to anyone who assumes unqualified distinctions of British superiority as compared to football’s development and emergence in the U.S.

This brings me to the current state of the U.S. Men’s National Team. In my last piece, I stated unequivocally that I believe the U-23 team that beat Mexico under Caleb Porter could have achieved a more convincing result against Italy than the Senior Team.

I received several responses and observed several others to the effect that the U-23 guys are too young or “unproven” to achieve better results than the current core of the Senior National Team. The gist is that a few years down the line, probably after this World Cup cycle, once these guys have matured and proven themselves at more “established” clubs, then they’ll be ready to achieve the same quality as the current Senior National Team.

The fact that most of the Senior team roster members start or play regularly for established European clubs is used as a flawed Halo Effect proxy for a more sophisticated analysis and understanding of player quality and what qualities contribute to form a dominant team.

This is also prevalent within MLS which has adopted a fairly dysfunctional dual personality of claiming that the league’s development is driving the quality of the USMNT while marooning many young players in favor of signing and playing foreign players from more established soccer nations in Europe or South America or preserving careers of veteran players without international exit options. It’s no wonder MLS has a higher average player age than most teams in leagues that develop top talent.

To evolve as a footballing nation, we must raise our awareness to cut through the Halo Effect (and the other cognitive biases and misunderstandings that have dogged our development) to grasp what makes dominant footballing teams, such as Bielsa’s Bilbao, successful.

In some cases, the Halo’s are supported by the real deal of technical quality and philosophical foundation. Anyone who watched Bielsa’s Chile during their successful 2010 World Cup run could see a near identical playing style as compared to current Bilbao under Bielsa. The thread between the two is Bielsa’s obsessive understanding and playing philosophy and his unwavering commitment to develop and select a team and players that achieves his vision of how to dominate and “play on the opponents turf.” Another common thread between Chile and Bilbao is that the players available came from a limited pool (Basque Origin with Bilbao, Total population of about 15 million with Chile).

What is telling is that many of Bielsa’s players have gone on to visibility and success after successful runs with Bielsa coached teams. Most notably, Bielsa gave FC Barcelona and former Liverpool star Javier Mascherano his first Argentine senior national team appearance before making a first team appearance with his club team River Plate. Mascherano has since gone on to a hugely successful career for club and country. Mascherano’s FCB teammate Alexis Sanchez joined Barca after Chile’s successful run during the 2010 WC and reportedly after Bielsa’s positive recommendation to Pep Guardiola regarding Sanchez’ work ethic and personality.

The ability of a coach to see through the Halo Effect of a player’s club situation to discern true quality is a hallmark of a coach with a fully formed philosophy and foundation. A coach who relies on confirmation of player quality through a seemingly favorable club situation is an indicator that they will likely fail to implement a discernible philosophy and system.

In the U.S., we must stop relying on coaches and teams “over there” as reliable indicators of our own development and progress as a footballing nation. I believe we are about to receive a significant shock to our perception as to what is immediately possible with U.S. bred players through Caleb Porter’s U-23 National Team.

The performance that Porter is capable of inducing with his players could quickly put the names of Okugo, Kitchen, Corona and Agudelo on the tip of the world football tongue after qualification and the Olympic games. We are in uncharted territory with regards to having a coach with the ability to implement a philosophy on par with the world’s best. Porter has shown that he has the ability to cut through all the noise that has held us back and produce a footballing product that can consistently compete with Spain, Germany, Argentina and Brazil. Every performance he puts together with the U-23s will knock down the strawmen and shatter the perception that we’re still 10 or 15 years away from having players in top clubs and competing internationally with the best of the best. The best part is that it looks like he will largely do it with MLS players/players that were developed in the U.S.

Confidence Games

“Yet not long after this savior had arrived, the product had proved immutable, the transfer incompatible, not so much because of the raw materials—the actual players, who were flawed but seemed capable of change—but because of the system that produced the raw materials and people who controlled the system.”

This passage is taken from Jim Yardley’s wonderful book Brave Dragons: A Chinese Basketball Team, an American Coach, and Two Cultures Clashing.

Brave Dragons tells the story of former Seattle Supersonics head coach Bob Weiss, who was hired by the Chinese Basketball Association’s Shanxi Brave Dragons to become the team’s head coach at the start of the 2008-2009 season. Weiss was brought in by Brave Dragons owner Boss Wang, a volatile and NBA-obsessed steel mill owner, who sought Weiss’s expertise as a means to form the Brave Dragons into an NBA style team.

As the season progresses, Weiss’s efforts to install an NBA style offense and teach progressive basketball skills (primarily individual decision making and awareness within the system) are regularly short circuited by Boss Wang’s kneejerk insistence on running the team through endless conditioning drills and demanding the team adhere to Wang’s latest backwards whims on how to be more like former and present NBA legends like Michael Jordan and Steve Nash (which always seem to boil down to being more aggressive and initiating physical contact with opponents).

Weiss is repeatedly told that his methods are inappropriate for Chinese players in large part because of the widely held belief that Chinese players are genetically inferior to players in other basketballing nations. Correspondingly, Chinese players are chosen for advancement and trained based on crude measures of physical growth potential rather than technical excellence or understanding of the game.

Boss Wang and his deputy, Liu Tie, explain to Weiss the conventional wisdom that the only way the Brave Dragons and Chinese players in general will achieve basketball superiority is by enduring intense physical exercise that will toughen them up and make them stronger. 

At several points Weiss (and his tactics and philosophies) are relegated far down the line of authority while Wang and Liu Tie manage and coach the team.  In lieu of Weiss’s NBA-light tactics and playing philosophy, Wang and Tie spend practice forcing the players to run until exhaustion and screaming at the players for any perceived lack of toughness or agression.

The result is predictable. During the games the Chinese players are completely lost and chaotic. The Brave Dragons rely on a revolving cast of foreign players, including former NBA player Bonzi Wells, to initiate offensive production amidst the unstructured chaos. Wells and the other foreign players are horrified at the lack of coherent philosophy and sociopathic behaviors of Boss Wang and his subordinates. Wang’s draconian methods come to a boil when he punches various players and staff members in several different incidents throughout the season.

This struggle between professional sporting intellect and deeply ingrained cultural and sporting cognitive biases should sound familiar to soccer fans and constituents in the United States. I still can’t believe my eyes when something like the opinions in this piece  are published as acceptable analysis. Blah blah blah, we just don’t have the players; we have to scrap out games against WORLD SUPERPOWERS!!! (who happened to have finished last in their groups at WC 2010) like Italy and France.  

Anyone who watched Caleb Porter’s U-23 team take on Mexico should feel a real hot streak of skepticism towards this “We’re the underdog and that’s just how it is” line of thinking. Our guys went at a very talented Mexico U-23 team and showed the senior team how it should be done. I have no reservations stating that we could have achieved a similar if not better result against Italy with the U-23 squad that was on the field last Wednesday against Mexico.

Altidore and Dempsey aren’t working to recover possession? Fine, bring in Gyau, Agudelo, or Adu who all showed commitment to pressuring and tracking the Mexicans all over the field. Bradley and Edu won’t close down Pirlo? Bring in Diskerud, Corona, and Morales who were right on top of the talented Mexican central midfielders when they received the ball.

It’s hard to say whether the U-23s who played against Mexico are the best American players eligible for the age group or whether the same team will be on the field during Olympic qualification. What is for sure is that none of these U-23 roster members tasted the champagne development curricula of places like Barcelona or Ajax. Many of them came up through the same dysfunctional American system that produced the core of the senior team.

The takeaway is that Porter’s philosophy and his ability to communicate to his players cuts through all the noise about the limitations of “American soccer culture” or the established player pool. The only thing stopping us from producing teams and players of high footballing quality is ourselves and our inability to see past the cognitive biases and wrongheaded “conventional wisdom” about our shortcomings as a footballing nation.

The evolution we’ve been waiting for and that Klinsmann has been describing in the future tense is happening right now with the U-23’s under Porter. Porter has successfully implemented the style and philosophy Klinsmann has identified as a goal but failed to produce. Klinsmann’s product is becoming indistinguishable from the status quo of American soccer.

Is Klinsmann’s situation a case similar to Weiss’s, where his expertise is caged by structural and systemic factors? The mediocre national team performances compared to the inspirational and progressive performance of the U-23’s suggest otherwise. While I’m sure there are some factors that Klinsmann could point to as roadblocks for implementing his philosophy and style of play (marketing pressure, agents, etc…), one of the benefits of being a national team coach is a high degree of discretion in choosing the philosophy, player pool, and technical staff.  Unlike Porter, Klinsmann has failed to utilize this discretion to demonstrate a cohesive and progressive footballing product.

Unfortunately, it is beginning to appear that Klinsmann’s methods are skewed by a sense that his value is closer to a psychological guru as opposed to progressive leader. After the Italy game, Klinsmann identified the primary value of the win as a means to elevate the MNT player’s self-confidence when playing against “established” teams like Italy (Reminder: Italy took last in their Group in WC 2010) as if some adolescent lack of confidence was the real roadblock. Did the U.S. players look real confident when they were totally bunkered for the last 20 minutes or when Pirlo was dropping dime after dime over our back line and our central midfielders dropped 20 yards off of him?

What about when the U.S. beat Spain in the 2009 Confederations Cup with a team consisting of many of the same players as the Italy squad? Shouldn’t that have been some sort of cathartic confidence boost for the consistency of our game to levels previously unseen?

By contrast, Porter’s post game comments identified the system that he implemented with the U-23s and praised the players’ ability to execute the tasks required to impose the system and philosophy on the opponent. Porter’s leadership is rooted in the system that he has chosen and implemented. The players are charged with executing the tasks he has communicated to them as a means to achieve collective superiority. The players’ commitment and collective buying into Porter’s philosophy was an inspirational display of the potential of U.S. Soccer. They have been chosen because of their abilities to work within the system and they did so admirably against Mexico.

Confidence isn’t gained by getting lucky every couple of years against more storied footballing nations. It comes from implementing a successful philosophy and rehearsing the system until it’s down cold. If a coach cannot initiate this by communicating a set of coherent, cohesive principles and making hard decisions to see that those principles are carried out, the cracks of incoherence and lack of a unified understanding start to show and the system starts to fall apart.