Football Garden

month

January 2013

4 posts

Smaller Rulers Continued:

After my last post Dave Laidig from Footiebusiness and I got into a discussion going a bit deeper into the the relationship between MLS and local/club football culture (with particular reference to the Cascadia MLS clubs). The full thread is here. 

I spent a while on one of my responses so I figured I’d post the best of it here to expand on what I was trying to get at in the first “smaller rulers” post: 

So, my question is: As a supporter or fan of the professional game, do we approach this debate from a viewpoint of the “league” needing to be successful/sustainable, or; do we approach it from the viewpoint of building sustainable clubs/teams that raise the level of Division 1 soccer organically? Do we look at it from the top down, or from the bottom up?

It’s my sense that these two approaches produce a different set of priorities depending on which one you adopt. That’s where the Cascadia debate comes into play for me. At a business level, there’s a unique symbiotic relationship between supporters and the individual teams which MLS (which includes Por/Sea/Van ownership) took a dump on by making the trademark play. Legally, I haven’t seen a single analysis in MLS’s favor (at least based on U.S. TM law). And yet, the Cascadia supporters were criticized for not being sensitive enough to the “league’s” interests (not by you Dave, but by several others).

There’s no doubt the Cascadia teams have benefited by joining MLS. But so have the other MLS teams! Like the teams with the fans, the teams have a symbiotic relationship with one another. Financially, Por/Sea/Van are all pulling their weight and subsidizing the teams that have been in MLS for longer.

MLS’s single entity set up is effectively a formalization of hyper-structured symbiotic relationships between teams. Clubs give up a significant amount of control as part of the bargain to join up with other teams within the DI sanctioned entity. The coaches, players, fans and team staff are all effected by this bargain and the agreements under which MLS operates.

The nature of these relationships has changed over time. The Designated Player, Home Grown Player, and draft rules have all been implemented or changed from year to year to reflect the owner’s wishes for how they want the relationships to exist. Each time a new team joins or a new ownership group takes over an existing team, the relationships change a little bit.

The clubs are trying to put the best product they can on the field in spite of the league’s rules and regulations, not because of them. This all happens at the club level and coaches and owners get pissed all the time when the rest of MLS refuses to sign off on a personnel move that could help the team put a better product on the field. Remember this: http://www.thestar.com/sports/soccer/mls/article/1278643–toronto-fc-s-hands-tied-by-meddling-mls-kelly

These rules and regulations don’t do a whole lot of good if nobody pays to see the show put on by the teams. Are people going to pay for a ticket or watch on tv because of MLS’s unique set of rules and regulations if the soccer being played doesn’t draw an audience on its own? Are their really folks out there that loooove single entity and the re-entry draft?

I’m not arguing that Seattle or any other current MLS team should ditch MLS if this Cascadia issue isn’t resolved to their liking (who knows, SEA may have been advocating to TM the Cascadia Cup). Rather, I’m advocating for a analytical shift in how we evaluate the relative value of what the “league” actually is and what it contributes vs. what the symbiotic relationship between the clubs and supporters contributes to the overall success and sustainability of Division 1 soccer in the U.S.

Jan 29, 20130 notes
We need smaller rulers

There’s a scientific principle in several different types of measurement that basically goes: the smaller the ruler, the longer the measurement. If we wanted to draw a map of the Western coastline from the Mexican to the Canadian Border we could observe from distance through a telescope and obtain a potentially useful approximation of the length. However, if we wish to obtain a more precise measurement we could set out to use smaller measuring instruments, say a closer telescope measurement from a boat or even a length of rope set and reset along the coast itself. 

Neither example is inherently better or more valuable than the other. It depends on the scale of the map we want to draw. 

I was reminded of this principle by the recent debate over MLS’s action to file for trademark registration of the Cascadia Cup term/brand. Supporters groups for the Vancouver, Portland, and Seattle franchises have spoken out vehemently against MLS’s interloping behavior. 

Given the history of the Cascadia Cup (it was started by the supporter’s groups while all three teams were outside of MLS) and MLS’s flimsy reasoning for filing the trademark registration (protecting from unidentified “outside” exploitation), I was surprised to see folks argue in support of MLS’s action and portray the supporter’s opposition as some petulant, self-absorbed political outburst.

There is an ideology, it seems, that putting our faith in MLS as the chief monetizer of all things soccer is the only way to avoid NASL style division 1 armageddon. MLS’s financial success and expansion, it goes, takes priority over things like observing ownership rights that belong to supporter’s groups, allowing players to be paid according to market value, or allowing competitive results to decide which clubs compete at the Division 1 level through a promotion/relegation system.

Of course, the “league” isn’t an independent entity governed by checks and balances designed to ensure transparency and accessibility, it’s an opaque joint venture managed by business owners. Some of whom decided at several points that the Pacific NW teams were not good bets for MLS expansion despite significant existing team and supporter infrastructure. 

This aspect of the debate is the most interesting to me. Unlike every other MLS franchise, (with the sort of exception of the Earthquakes) the Whitecaps, Timbers, and Sounders existed successfully and were passed over multiple times before entering MLS. They had all forged identities and community support without MLS. The little details, the things that make a football club organic and real and not feel like a trip to a chain strip mall, many of those developed before the teams entered MLS. 

There are reasons for the Sounders, Timbers, and Whitecaps success that don’t show up on the MLS balance sheet or in Don Garber’s state of the league address. As supporters and constituents of U.S. Soccer, I propose to you that we borrow the “smaller rulers” principle to understand not only the success of the Cascadia clubs, but how we should draw the map for our future progress. 

The world outside of sport is showing us that small is beautiful and large, expanding, and interdependent bureaucracies can halt progress and bring the world to its knees. 

Every day and night there are millions of people in the United States who go to parks or gyms or stadiums to watch and play football. Young and old, different cultures, ethnicities and economic backgrounds, all finding unique passion and joy in a life of football. The diversity is inspiring and astounding, each game or field possessing a unique mix of the millions of details that can go unnoticed by the uninformed or uninterested.

So, I submit to you that we have a choice: Do we celebrate the diversity and the details and show our appreciation by allowing the small to grow up through the ranks, the minor to become the major through competition? Or, do we put our faith in the slick and deliberate comfort of the “league’s best interests”, sticking with metrics for success that are divorced from the jagged and exciting realties of humanity and the rich footballing culture that exists at the grassroots level in the United States. 

I find it fair to say that choosing one path or the other has significant consequences, many of which are not easily explainable or observable. I also submit to you that MLS and U.S. Soccer have been operating according to the latter path throughout MLS’s existence. It is important to understand the consequences of this path for our soccer pyramid. The league’s existence and expansion is a measure of success, but I ask that we consider the smaller, less readily observable and explainable realities as we consider our way forward. 

Jan 25, 20131 note
A note about the podcast schedule (Updated 1/23)

UPDATE (1/23): Unfortunately the guest I had planned for the 1/23 podcast didn’t work out. Working to put together the next episode hopefully soon. 

I’ve gotten a few notes wondering about the podcast schedule. I’m working on putting together the first podcast of 2013. I’m very excited about the guest and I think it will make for a compelling and educational conversation. That said, I want to mention that the podcast scheduling will be different for a little while.

I have a specific idea in mind for what I want the podcasts to convey via the format and guests that I ask to join the podcast. Currently, I don’t think it’s realistic to achieve that as often as twice a week. So, for the time being, I’ve decided to move away from the regular posting schedule and adopt a more sporadic schedule. I hate to do this because I’ve really enjoyed providing regular content for folks that enjoy the podcasts. But, I don’t want to sacrifice what I want to achieve with the podcast for the sake of regularly producing content. 

Jan 10, 20130 notes
Gatekeepers

The pitchforks are out for Sepp Blatter after he made some vague criticisms towards the current state of MLS. Although I may agree with the general sentiment, I don’t find Blatter’s remarks insightful or well informed by what’s taking place on the ground in the U.S. Unfortunately, I haven’t found much substance in the criticisms of Blatter’s remarks either. 

Of all the rationalizations and explanations of the current state of MLS and U.S. Soccer prompted by Blatter’s comments, I haven’t seen any of the outraged journalists/fans/etc. go with the simplest and most effective comeback of all: “Say what you want Sepp, we’ll do our talking on the field.”

Instead, I’ve observed lots of talk about how MLS’s unique rules and structure are meaningful to ensure the league progresses at a reasonable pace and that low tv ratings are largely the result of competition with other major U.S. sports or international soccer leagues. 

The beauty of football as a form of entertainment is that competition is a fairly reliable way to settle debates over quality. The World Cup is an open tournament. So is the CONCACAF Champions League and Club World Cup. Assuming good standing with the relevant governing bodies, the value of these events as spectacle is to settle questions of quality with competitive results. As things currently stand, none of Sepp Blatter’s whims or rants can keep the U.S. or an MLS team from stepping on the field and dropping a big F.U. to critics by winning a World Cup or the CONCACAF Champions League or the Club World Cup.

There are no gatekeepers in international competitions to prevent teams/nations from demonstrating their superiority at the highest levels. 

And yet, we’ve convinced ourselves that our means to produce superior soccer are dependent on an elaborate network of interdependent gatekeepers to manage the health of our soccer system. 

Instead of annual promotion and relegation to establish which clubs deserve to be at the highest level of the U.S. Soccer pyramid by virtue of their on field performances, we have Don Garber pitching PowerPoint presentations at community meetings in New York for a team that doesn’t exist. 

Instead of youth development programs designed to foster professional skill and dedication we have a draft and centralized player allocation system that values parity and owner leverage over rewarding long-term development investment. 

We glow over the prospect of providing the next golden parachute to whichever past their prime “big star” chooses New York over Beijing or Moscow, while willfully ignoring young players who have to take second jobs to make a living or who signed hyped up HGP contracts only to be unceremoniously cut a few years later. 

Let’s be honest with ourselves, this way of doing things has consequences. We need look no farther than last season’s U.S. Open Cup to understand that our system might need tinkering to make sure we’re operating to the best of our abilities as a footballing nation. 

Two MLS teams were knocked out by Division 4 Amateur teams. Four MLS teams were defeated by Division 3 USL Pro teams. Three MLS teams were defeated by Division 2 NASL teams. 

Are we reassured by the MLS/U.S. Soccer gatekeepers insistence that MLS is the best we have to offer in this country and getting better? Can we chalk up nine of sixteen MLS teams losing to coincidence and a bit of fatigue or bad luck? 

Blatter’s comments might have lacked sophistication, but it’s not like he’s trying to ban the U.S. from playing in the World Cup or threatening to decertify U.S. Soccer. U.S. Soccer/MLS still has the opportunity to shut up the haters at every international/club tournament we enter. After all, people aren’t tuning in to see who Blatter thinks is the best, they’re watching because the competitions are open to all to prove who is the best. 

As we take aim on becoming one of the best footballing nations in the world, how can we justify a system where we place faith in the judgment of gatekeepers over the organic process of open competition as our rudder towards achieving superiority?

This isn’t to question people like Garber’s intelligence or judgment or diminish their contribution to the longevity of MLS. By most accounts MLS wouldn’t exist were it not for Garber’s enterprise and his work should never be ignored or understated. Rather, I merely seek to reaffirm a simple premise that underscores the entire debate about MLS and the national team: we play the games for a reason. 

Jan 01, 20131 note

December 2012

6 posts

Podcast: Brent Goulet

Today’s Podcast is sponsored by Magpie Coffee Roasters! Click here to learn more about Magpie.

Click here to listen: Podcast with Brent Goulet

Brent Goulet began his professional playing career in the Pacific Northwest after playing for Warner Pacific College. His prolific goal scoring helped him to earn selection to the U.S. Olympic Team and full Men’s National Team. During his club career, Brent played in the U.S. and England before settling in Germany, where he spent 18 years as a player and coach. Brent began his coaching career with SV Elversberg after suffering a broken leg that ended his playing career. Brent was an assistant coach with SV Elversberg from 2001-2004 and head coach of the club from 2004-2008. He is now based in Nashville, TN working as a coach and consultant for Tennessee Youth Soccer and a scout for U.S. Soccer. 

Dec 20, 20120 notes
Podcast: Patrick McCabe

Today’s Podcast is sponsored by Magpie Coffee Roasters! Click here to learn more about Magpie.

Click Here to Listen: Podcast with Patrick McCabe

Patrick McCabe is an experienced player agent who began his career in the soccer business as the first American to play professionally in South Africa. Upon returning to the United States, Patrick began his career as a player agent by initiating MLS trials for several of his former South African teammates. As President of Santio Sports + Entertainment, Patrick has represented American players in all aspects of player negotiations and career transitions in domestic and international settings.  

Dec 19, 20120 notes
Podcast: Hugo Perez

Today’s Podcast is sponsored by Magpie Coffee Roasters! Click here to learn more about Magpie. 

Click here to listen: Podcast Episode with Hugo Perez

Hugo Perez joined the podcast to discuss his playing career, his work as a coach, and his vision for the evolution of U.S. Soccer. A decorated player who was elected to the National Soccer Hall of Fame in 2008, Hugo is generous in sharing his philosophy and approach to football as a coach and educator. Hugo is currently the Head Coach for the U.S. Boys U-14 National Team and Technical Advisor to U.S. Soccer for the Northwest U.S. Region.   

Dec 14, 20121 note
Podcast: Greg Petersen

Today’s Podcast is sponsored by Magpie Coffee Roasters! Click here to learn more about Magpie. 

Click here to listen: Podcast with Greg Petersen

Throughout his prolific coaching career, Greg Petersen has pioneered a technical, attacking philosophy at professional and youth clubs throughout the United States. He began his coaching career in Northern California and is currently the Technical Director for Central Florida club Plant City FC. In addition to his youth coaching, Greg is a Technical Consultant to extraTime football consultants, a consulting and player representation firm that represents Steven Pienaar, Benni McCarthy, and Victor Wanyama among others. 

Dec 12, 20120 notes
Podcast: Peter Wilt

Today’s Podcast is sponsored by Magpie Coffee Roasters! Click here to learn more about Magpie. 

Click Here to Listen: Podcast Episode with Peter Wilt

Since he began his career in soccer with the Milwaukee Wave front office in 1987, Peter Wilt has been responsible for the management, formation, and promotion of professional soccer teams and leagues in MLS, WPS, MISL, NISL, U.S. Interregional Soccer Leagues, the Continental Indoor Soccer League, the National Professional Soccer League, and the American Indoor Soccer Association. In 1997, Peter took responsibilities as the President and General Manager of the Chicago MLS expansion team, which went on to become the Chicago Fire. Under Peter’s leadership, the Fire won both the MLS Cup and U.S. Open Cup in the team’s inaugural season. After leaving the Fire in 2005, Peter returned to the Milwaukee Wave as President and CEO and went on to form and oversee the Chicago Red Stars of the WPS and the Chicago Riot of the Major Indoor Soccer League. He is currently engaged as a consultant to a group evaluating NASL expansion opportunities in Indianapolis. 

Dec 07, 20120 notes
Podcast: Bryan Wallace

Today’s Podcast is sponsored by Magpie Coffee Roasters! Click here to learn more about Magpie. 

Click here to listen: Football Garden Podcast with Bryan Wallace

After growing up in Jamaica and playing for the Jamaican U-17 and U-20 National Teams, Bryan Wallace came to the United States seeking to continue his footballing career. A chance meeting with coach Afshin Ghotbi led to Bryan joining Willem II Tilburg in the Dutch Eredivise. After his stint with Willem II ended, Bryan returned to the United States and began his prolific coaching career. Bryan is currently the Assistant Director of Coaching for Older Boys for the Southern California youth club United F.C. In addition to his youth coaching, Bryan has coached at the collegiate level with Cal Poly Pomona and U.C. Irvine. 

Dec 05, 20120 notes

November 2012

7 posts

Podcast: U-14 BNT Camp and College Cup

Click Here for Football Garden Podcast: U-14 BNT Camp and College Cup

Brian and Gary Kleiban joined me to talk U-14 Boys National Team Camp and Akron’s loss to Creighton. 

Nov 30, 20120 notes
Podcast: Peter Lowry

Click Here to listen: Football Garden Podcast with Peter Lowry

Peter Lowry joined the podcast to discuss his professional career and the realities of trying to stick as a young American player in MLS. After a successful playing career at Santa Clara University, Peter was drafted by the Chicago Fire. While working to adapt to the demands of professional soccer and become a core member of the Fire among players like Cuauhtemoc Blanco, Brian McBride and Freddie Ljungberg, Peter took a second job as a tax accountant to support himself. After three seasons with the Fire, Peter was drafted by the Portland Timbers in the 2010 Expansion Draft and stayed with the club until 2011. Peter founded the blog thelowrylowdown.com where he shares his thoughts and insights about his playing career and life as an MLS player.   

Nov 28, 20120 notes
Football Garden Holiday Reading List

Over the years, I’ve had the pleasure of reading several non-soccer related books that have deeply influenced my soccer philosophy and my thoughts about the American game. All of these books discuss human cognition and cognitive biases in some respect and most of them address the failings of familiar and easy to understand narratives we use to process information and make decisions. 

Soccer, like many things, is a constant cycle of information and action or reaction. I think the books below are great resources in understanding how to refine and improve our understanding of the information we observe in our endeavors.

With the holiday season upon us, I figured I’d share these books in case anyone is in the market for some new reading material or gift ideas. Feel free to share anything I left off!

1) I Am A Strange Loop-Douglas Hofstadter 

2) Fooled by Randomness-Nassim Nicholas Taleb

3) The Misbehavior of Markets-Benoit Mandelbrot

4) The Halo Effect-Phil Rosenzweig

5) Thinking, Fast and Slow-Daniel Kahneman

6) Adapt: Why Success Always Starts with Failure-Tim Harford

7) The Bed of Procrustes-Nassim Nicholas Taleb

8) Bright Sided: How Positive Thinking is Undermining America-Barbara Ehrenreich

9) The Management Myth-Matthew Stewart

10) Econned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism-Yves Smith

11) The Gardens of Democracy-Eric Liu and Nick Hanauer

12) The Signal and the Noise-Nate Silver

13) More Like Us- James Fallows

Nov 21, 20121 note
Podcast: Josh Hakala

Click Here to listen: Podcast Episode with Josh Hakala

Josh Hakala helped launch the predecessor website to TheCup.us in 2003 to promote the Lamar Hunt U.S. Open Cup and provide historical information about the Tournament. The U.S. Open Cup is entering it’s 100th year and Josh and his team have created an unequalled resource for historical information and timely reporting on U.S. Open Cup developments. Josh and I talked about the history of the Open Cup and TheCup.us website, the most recent Tournament and amateur team Cal F.C.’s cinderella run, and what the future holds for the U.S. Open Cup.

Nov 16, 20120 notes
Podcast: Jon Burklo

Click here to listen to podcast episode with Jon Burklo

Following a four year playing career at Liberty University, Jon Burklo contacted hundreds of European clubs seeking a playing opportunity and a chance to break into European football. He found his way to a second-division Norwegian club and eventually played in Finland’s first-division before returning to the U.S. to continue his professional career. After stints with several American clubs, including the D.C. United and Houston Dynamo reserve teams, Jon decided to refocus his passion for soccer towards coaching. He is now the Director of Boys Academy for Lonestar Soccer Club San Antonio and founder and author of Soccer Purist (soccerpurist.wordpress.com), a soccer education and coaching blog. 

Nov 14, 20120 notes
Podcast: Kephern Fuller

Click Here: Podcast Episode with Kephern Fuller

After a four year playing career at George Mason University, Kephern Fuller made his way to the Netherlands where his playing attracted the interest of Cambuur Leuwarden, a Dutch second division club. He trained with the Dutch club for several months but was ultimately unable to secure a contract due to work permit issues. Upon returning to the United States, Keph set out to use what he had learned during his time in Holland and throughout his playing career to establish Joga SC, a non-profit coaching and education organization operating in the D.C./Maryland/Northern Virginia area. 

Nov 09, 20120 notes
Podcast: Tom Byer

Click Here: Football Garden Podcast-Tom Byer

Tom Byer is a native New Yorker who has become an internationally recognized leader in Japanese youth football/soccer development over the last 25 years. Tom began offering youth coaching clinics in Japan after the end of his professional playing career with a Japanese club. Since then, Tom has been a prolific coach and educator offering thousands of youth clinics throughout Japan and expanding his educational influence through Japanese television, animation, instructional videos and print media. In addition to his work in Japan, Tom recently accepted an appointment with the Chinese education department to implement soccer education in Chinese schools. Tom joined the podcast to discuss his background, his work as a youth coach/educator, and his thoughts on what can be learned from Japan’s rapid progress as a footballing nation. 

Nov 07, 20120 notes

October 2012

2 posts

Football Garden Podcast #1: Brian and Gary Kleiban

Click Here: Podcast #1 Brian and Gary Kleiban

Brian and Gary Kleiban are creating a model platform for progress in U.S. Soccer. Brian is the Director of Coaches at Barcelona USA based in Los Angeles. Gary is the founder and main author of 3four3.com. The Kleibans are intelligent, honest, and opinionated but most of all, they are committed to producing coaching and educational quality at a level unforeseen in the United States. We spent some time to chat about their experiences as coaches, their influences, and the roadblocks to progress within U.S. Soccer. Questions, comments, rants? Give me a shout at footballgardens@gmail.com. 

Oct 31, 20120 notes
Style Points

As it became clear that we were going to avoid catastrophic embarrassment by advancing into the hexagonal round of CONCACAF world cup qualifying, I began to gather my thoughts and emotions on the strange ride U.S. Soccer has taken since Jurgen Klinsmann took over as head coach of the Men’s National Team.

Going back to the beginning, I think Klinsmann’s appointment represented something that many in the American soccer/football community, including myself, have craved for years: credibility. Finally, a coach with world-class credentials was coming to take the reins of the unbroken thoroughbred with limitless potential that is soccer in the U.S.

We projected the scope of Klinsmann’s competence far and wide. How quickly will Klinsmann be able to fix the youth program? Which future superstars will he pluck from obscurity? Which Rio De Janeiro beaches should we party at after the U.S. advances to previously unseen heights at the 2014 World Cup?

And then there was the “style” question. Style, style, style. What masterstroke would Klinsmann devise to finally settle U.S. Soccer on a style of play befitting America’s cultural and socioeconomic diversity? We have underprivileged Latinos so we should dribble a bunch, right? But we also have next level “athletes” from the good side of town so we need to whip it in and have a target man. And let’s not forget the defense. American’s are disciplined and stubborn and so we should never ever give up goals, ever.

So, here we are. After all the hype and hope we seem to be in a familiar cycle of white knuckling through games that we should be dominating and flipping a switch from catastrophe to limitless optimism after sneaking by inferior opposition. After limping into the final pre-hex qualifier with a dismal performance against Antigua and Barbuda, the U.S. executed a convincing performance to defeat Guatemala and win their group. Optimism restored, Rio beach party back on the calendar.

In the wake of the Guatemala victory, the “style” debate was one that became stuck in my head. Given the U.S.’s not so easy ride to the Hex, it’s easy to conclude that Klinsmann’s lofty stated ambitions to turn the U.S. into a dominant attacking power were undermined by underappreciated CONCACAF opponents, lack of quality/depth in the U.S. player pool or a combination of the two.

Klinsmann himself resorted to giving ominous statements regarding the difficulty of CONCACAF. More disappointing, it became clear that Klinsmann hasn’t settled on a tactical framework, formation, or consistent set of personnel to evolve the level of collective performance in a meaningful way.  

A prevailing narrative seems to be forming that Klinsmann has “learned a lesson” to the effect that all that “style” mumbo jumbo has rightly been thrown out the window. The way forward, it seems, is to continue grinding out 2-1 victories against nations the size of the Ohio State student population while we wait patiently for the “AMERICAN MESSI” to appear before us in a golden haze somewhere on the youth soccer fields of suburban Virginia or L.A. Or maybe Jozy will learn how to not pass to the other team and actually give a shit on defense. One of the two.

As I viewed it, Klinsmann’s original charge was to transcend the noise and dysfunction many of us experience at the ground level of U.S. Soccer and put together a product that could be held up as a model for development. Instead, we are back in the weeds of where we started with many commentators smugly satisfied that Klinsmann has resorted to touting CONCACAF’s competitive virtues and resorting to a less ambitious strategy as the U.S. bumbled into the Hex.

Is this lack of progress truly a result of shitty fields in Jamaica or a genetic failure of the entire U.S. population of 380 million people to produce a quality left back?

I don’t think so. I think the failure to move forward falls largely on Klinsmann.

This brings me back to the style question. I watched with some amusement/disbelief as prominent soccer commentators addressed the style question as if what we were really going for was a team that looked good and tried more stepovers rather than gained results. “Quit yer naive fancy footing possession game and get back in a 4-4-2 for God’s sake. Some of us have stock portfolio’s to look after!”

Heavy is the burden these straw men must feel. A style of play isn’t about going Neymar 100 times a game or by trying to meg guys rather than score goals or defend. Adapting a style of play is quite simply an exercise in trying to get everyone on the same page in order to manage and take control of the chaos that is a competitive soccer game. It’s the 12th, 13th and 14th man on the field; the means by which a team can become more than the sum of its parts.

Digging a bit deeper, an effective style of play will force an opponent to react to what your team is doing more often than not. This dictation of the course of a game can be achieved through dominant possession (a la Barcelona) or by managing space/pressure and counter-attacking quickly (a la Catennacio or Mourinho coached teams). The key in both situations is a unified, collective understanding of each player’s role and purpose on the field, especially when a team is seeking to recover the ball.

Have Klinsmann’s teams demonstrated such a unified understanding of an effective style during his tenure? Unfortunately, the conclusion I have come to is that they have not. Instead, we have played down to our opponent’s level and, once again, had just enough talent and luck not to suffer a major embarrassment.

Superior coaches know exactly what they want and how to get it. Former Ajax, Barcelona, and Bayern Munich coach Louis Van Gaal was appointed manager of the Netherlands following the failure of Euro 2012. In his first game of the 2014 World Cup Qualifying campaign against Hungary, Van Gaal started six players aged 22 or younger, including outside back Jetro Willems who is 18. Holland beat Hungary comfortably 4-1 and has gone on to easy victories against Andorra and Romania to gain top spot in their qualifying group.

Van Gaal is a notorious hard ass for getting his players to understand and perform within the possession-based system he favors and has the chops to deliver.  He is also a devoted proponent to homegrown development and education of players. No surprise then that Van Gaal feels confident relying on young talent from within the Eriedivisie to staff his teams after one of the most embarrassing episodes in Holland’s footballing memory.

There’s a lot going on in U.S. Soccer right now and it’s easy to fold an assessment of Klinsmann’s performance into a larger discussion on the issues hampering our development. But we must also remember that Klinsmann is getting paid far more than any of his predecessors (all of whom were experienced coaches) and we should constantly ask if we’re getting what we are paying for.

Tired, soft-pedaled excuses about how CONCACAF is real hard and how Americans don’t play enough street football while our team continues along the same mediocre path we were on pre-Klinsmann aren’t part of the bargain. Dominant performances through CONCACAF are not some unique impossibility because Antigua plays in a Cricket stadium and Guatemala has that one guy who dives sometimes.

Want proof? Mexico went 6-0 and won their group by 8 points. They played on Costa Rica’s turf field and won. They went to Guyana and El Salvador and won.

It’s great that we’ve made it this far in the hex and hopefully we will qualify for the World Cup. Unfortunately, Klinsmann’s USMNT performances do not reflect the competence and preparation of a coach that knows what he wants and how to get it. As qualifying heats up, I fear we will hear more noise and excuses as opposed to composed and organized performances that speak for themselves. 

Oct 22, 20120 notes

April 2012

1 post

Die by Your Own Ideas

Where would U.S. Soccer be if Sean Johnson got a little more of his hand on the ball? Or if one of the referees had seen Terrence Boyd get struck in the face? Or if Bill Hamid hadn’t rolled his ankle stepping out to snag a fairly routine cross?

I submit to you that if any of these situations, these instantaneous details, had turned out differently, the narrative depictions of the U-23 team’s group stage performance and its reflection of U.S. Soccer’s development would be telling a far different story. Remember the 180 degree turn in narrative and analysis after the Senior National Team scored a scrappy extra time goal to go from group stage failures to winners? In this unfair game and unfair world, lucky breaks and instantaneous details can shift fortunes and perceptions of quality in logarithmic fashion.

I applaud Caleb Porter for approaching this tournament the way he did. He was unapologetic in his choice to play a system and instill a philosophy, which many argue is “inappropriate” for American bred players. As a whole, the system did what it was supposed to do: dictate the tempo and rhythm of the game and create goal scoring opportunities.

Yes, he made mistakes. Primarily, several of his player selections proved detrimental to the system and style of play he was seeking to implement.

What should not be overlooked is that all three group stage games, the majority of the game took place in Cuba, Canada, and El Salvador’s defensive halves and the U.S. systematically created goal scoring opportunities during open play against teams that were organized effectively to counter the U.S.’s attacking system. 

The latter is no easy feat. The goals that the U-23’s scored were of the variety of which the U.S. Soccer community has coveted for years. Boyd’s opening goal against ES was the result of concerted U.S. pressure deep in El Salvador’s half. Joe Corona’s goal against El Salvador was the result of a multi-pass sequence that started from the back and quickly circulated through the U.S. lines to Adu who played a technical chip to Corona for the back post header.

Even against Canada, whose intensity and devotion to getting numbers behind the ball was staggering throughout the game, multi-pass sequences resulted in clear second half opportunities for Shea and Adu 8-12 yards in front of Canada’s goal. One, if not both, of those opportunities should have been converted.

That was the good. Of course, there was also plenty that could have been improved. The issue of player selection has been rightly raised as an area where Porter’s approach was flawed. For every Brek Shea 1 v. 3 that led to a turnover or the extra seconds it took Ike Opara to control a simple pass the plot slipped away from dominance towards uncertainty and heartbreak for the U-23s.

Many post mortems have pinned the blame for such flawed inclusions on the hackiness and structure of the youth development system. Others have claimed that a sense of entitlement for those lucky enough to navigate the U.S. Soccer mousetrap caused a systemic lack of grit and competitiveness.

If anything, these are symptoms that dance around the root cause.

If a possession based, dominant system is our goal (which I believe it should be) then we have to go “all in” selecting and developing players to meet the demands of such a system. There is a reluctance to abandon the idea that superior athleticism, largely defined by size and speed, will be a necessary ingredient for progression of U.S. Soccer. Even Porter, who’s philosophy and vision is historically superior to any recent U.S. coach, seems to have relied on the perceived safety of the “athletic” status quo to make some of his roster selections. It’s not Porter’s fault that Opara and Shea and others in their mold have been promoted through the ranks of U.S. Soccer despite their obvious flaws and incomplete skill sets. However, he is certainly accountable for their inclusion on the U-23 roster and for the prominent roles they played during the tournament. 

As we saw with the U-23s, there’s no place to hide your gigantic centerback with a poor first touch or one dimensional winger that coughs up the ball under pressure when you’re plan is to dominate possession and establish the rhythm of the game. Centerbacks and wingers must possess the skill and intellect to effectively maintain possession and recognize trouble spots before they happen. Raw athletic factors are useless unless the foundation (technique and brains! as Gary says) is in place. 

It all goes back to the craft, the details, and the sophistication of the game at the highest international levels. Make no mistake, CONCACAF “minnows” like Canada and El Salvador have the same unlimited access to footballing information the internet and modern media provide. They too are seeking to improve the quality of their football using every resource at their disposal. We are never going to have a place to hide our “athletes” on the field when our rivals and benchmark nations are improving at producing intelligent and skillful footballers at the highest levels, at every position.

The advantage we can gain over our rivals is by failing fast by learning every possible detail from where things have gone wrong and refining our methods accordingly. I’ve borrowed the title phrase of this piece “Die by your own ideas” from a quote by Johann Cruyff. The essence of the quote (at least how I interpret it) is that progress and ultimate success is best achieved by choosing a philosophy/set of ideals and constantly testing and refining those ideals to build a better system and seek better results. Failure provides significant opportunities for learning, growth, and reflection for those patient and reasonable enough to reflect and analyze the true causes of such failures.

Caleb Porter brought an overall philosophy shared by the world’s dominant footballing teams. His ownership of and advocacy for the team’s playing style sets him apart from other U.S. coaches defined by unidentifiable tactics and gravitation towards status quo. Unfortunately, I include Klinsmann in the latter group.

We can learn from the failures if we commit to the long-term buildup of the footballing craft in the U.S. That starts with recognizing how unsophisticated player selection can cause a well-intentioned system and philosophy to come unglued.

 Additional thoughts:

  • Okugo should have played a far more influential role throughout the tournament, possibly as a replacement for Opara. His passing was the cleanest and quickest of any U.S. player.
  • 3-4-3 would have been the logical formation adjustment against Canada’s defensive numbers bringing Gyau onto the RW and moving Adu into the #10 role below the center forward, taking out Villafana rather than Corona.
  • For all the talk about the defensive failings against El Salvador, Boyd should have scored at least one more goal in the first 15-20 minutes. He missed a point blank header, lost a breakaway on a bad touch, and tried to do a weird chest shot thing after being played through by Adu. Had Boyd score any of these, El Salvador might have fallen apart and the game could have been decided far earlier.  
Apr 03, 20120 notes

March 2012

4 posts

Play
Mar 24, 20120 notes
Halos over Bilbao

None of Atheltic Bilbao’s starters yesterday came to Bilbao as a result of a blockbuster summer transfer prior to this season. Most of them are under the age of 25 and came into the first team through Bilbao’s youth development system. All of the players are of Basque heritage.

Bielsa, Llorente, Munian, Martinez are names that will likely be on the tips of manager’s and pundit’s tongues as must have transfer targets for the “big” European clubs. Same with Tello, Cuenca, Samper and Dongou. While the Bilbao’s and Barcelona’s of the world patiently groom their next class of competent footballers to form the core of their teams, those clubs without such solid foundations will flail into the transfer market looking to poach the fruits of more confident, patient, and prescient clubs.

Bielsa’s future may be the most interesting. “El Loco’s” career moves over the years suggest that his footballing motivation is not fueled by striving to coach the club with the most prestige and access to the transfer market or that offers the biggest paycheck. His decision last summer to pass on the Inter Milan position in favor his current Bilbao post is evidence of what makes Bielsa tick.

When Bielsa joined Bilbao, he didn’t demand big name transfers. Bilbao’s historical football DNA—young, hard-working, devoted to youth development—was perfect for Bielsa’s philosophy and tactics, despite the fact that Bilbao historically used direct tactics oriented towards service to the tall and technical striker Fernando Llorrente. Bielsa needs guys that are willing to keep an open mind and adapt and buy-in to his system and philosophy. Young, hard working players that are willing to learn and execute their roles within the system fit within the sum greater than parts philosophy and system Bielsa implements.

The core of Bilbao’s team was in place prior to Bielsa’s arrival. However, Bielsa’s system and the successful and visible results it has produced will likely shoot Bilbao’s profile into the stratosphere. The metaphorical halos around Bielsa and many of the Bilbao players will inevitably form and catch the eye of players, owners, and coaches throughout world football.

I’m referring to the “Halo Effect.” The Halo Effect is sort of a catch all description of a human cognitive bias whereby an outside observer associates positive attributes or “goodness” with someone or something due to a easily observable appealing attribute of that person, thing or business.

The easiest and most common example of the Halo Effect is associating additional positive attributes (good judgment, reasoning etc…) due to a person’s physical attractiveness i.e. so and so “just looks like a good President/leader.” In business, the Halo Effect has been observed when analysts celebrate short term profitability or results of a company and proclaim it’s exemplary leadership/structure/marketing but fail to recognize less visible and more nuanced factors that lead to long term results and sometimes decline.

The Halo Effect is a major factor in football analysis, particularly within the U.S.

The most obvious example of this are single game results and goal scoring. Results and individual goals scored are the most visible and easily quantifiable metrics within the game. They are also the easiest way for mediocre players and teams to create a halo of quality that covers up technical flaws and structural insufficiencies.

I believe the Halo Effect has been historically influential in player selection for our National Team and potential MLS signings, particularly with regards to European vs. Domestic/Mexican club status of players. European leagues are painted with a broad brush when it comes to assumptions of quality. There can be a flawed lack of differentiation when making an assessment of quality between La Liga, Serie A, or the Bundesliga and Scandinavian or Mediterranean leagues. Simply because a player is playing in Denmark or Greece does not mean that they are exposed to higher level of quality than domestic players.

The biggest elephant in the room on this topic is the Premier League. The salaries and exposure of the English Premier League are among the world’s best. Yet quality within the league is inferior and waning with huge disparities in technical and coaching quality being revealed regularly at the international and European levels. One look at the state of the FA and the England coaching situation should give immediate pause to anyone who assumes unqualified distinctions of British superiority as compared to football’s development and emergence in the U.S.

This brings me to the current state of the U.S. Men’s National Team. In my last piece, I stated unequivocally that I believe the U-23 team that beat Mexico under Caleb Porter could have achieved a more convincing result against Italy than the Senior Team.

I received several responses and observed several others to the effect that the U-23 guys are too young or “unproven” to achieve better results than the current core of the Senior National Team. The gist is that a few years down the line, probably after this World Cup cycle, once these guys have matured and proven themselves at more “established” clubs, then they’ll be ready to achieve the same quality as the current Senior National Team.

The fact that most of the Senior team roster members start or play regularly for established European clubs is used as a flawed Halo Effect proxy for a more sophisticated analysis and understanding of player quality and what qualities contribute to form a dominant team.

This is also prevalent within MLS which has adopted a fairly dysfunctional dual personality of claiming that the league’s development is driving the quality of the USMNT while marooning many young players in favor of signing and playing foreign players from more established soccer nations in Europe or South America or preserving careers of veteran players without international exit options. It’s no wonder MLS has a higher average player age than most teams in leagues that develop top talent.

To evolve as a footballing nation, we must raise our awareness to cut through the Halo Effect (and the other cognitive biases and misunderstandings that have dogged our development) to grasp what makes dominant footballing teams, such as Bielsa’s Bilbao, successful.

In some cases, the Halo’s are supported by the real deal of technical quality and philosophical foundation. Anyone who watched Bielsa’s Chile during their successful 2010 World Cup run could see a near identical playing style as compared to current Bilbao under Bielsa. The thread between the two is Bielsa’s obsessive understanding and playing philosophy and his unwavering commitment to develop and select a team and players that achieves his vision of how to dominate and “play on the opponents turf.” Another common thread between Chile and Bilbao is that the players available came from a limited pool (Basque Origin with Bilbao, Total population of about 15 million with Chile).

What is telling is that many of Bielsa’s players have gone on to visibility and success after successful runs with Bielsa coached teams. Most notably, Bielsa gave FC Barcelona and former Liverpool star Javier Mascherano his first Argentine senior national team appearance before making a first team appearance with his club team River Plate. Mascherano has since gone on to a hugely successful career for club and country. Mascherano’s FCB teammate Alexis Sanchez joined Barca after Chile’s successful run during the 2010 WC and reportedly after Bielsa’s positive recommendation to Pep Guardiola regarding Sanchez’ work ethic and personality.

The ability of a coach to see through the Halo Effect of a player’s club situation to discern true quality is a hallmark of a coach with a fully formed philosophy and foundation. A coach who relies on confirmation of player quality through a seemingly favorable club situation is an indicator that they will likely fail to implement a discernible philosophy and system.

In the U.S., we must stop relying on coaches and teams “over there” as reliable indicators of our own development and progress as a footballing nation. I believe we are about to receive a significant shock to our perception as to what is immediately possible with U.S. bred players through Caleb Porter’s U-23 National Team.

The performance that Porter is capable of inducing with his players could quickly put the names of Okugo, Kitchen, Corona and Agudelo on the tip of the world football tongue after qualification and the Olympic games. We are in uncharted territory with regards to having a coach with the ability to implement a philosophy on par with the world’s best. Porter has shown that he has the ability to cut through all the noise that has held us back and produce a footballing product that can consistently compete with Spain, Germany, Argentina and Brazil. Every performance he puts together with the U-23s will knock down the strawmen and shatter the perception that we’re still 10 or 15 years away from having players in top clubs and competing internationally with the best of the best. The best part is that it looks like he will largely do it with MLS players/players that were developed in the U.S.

Mar 16, 20120 notes
Confidence Games

“Yet not long after this savior had arrived, the product had proved immutable, the transfer incompatible, not so much because of the raw materials—the actual players, who were flawed but seemed capable of change—but because of the system that produced the raw materials and people who controlled the system.”

This passage is taken from Jim Yardley’s wonderful book Brave Dragons: A Chinese Basketball Team, an American Coach, and Two Cultures Clashing.

Brave Dragons tells the story of former Seattle Supersonics head coach Bob Weiss, who was hired by the Chinese Basketball Association’s Shanxi Brave Dragons to become the team’s head coach at the start of the 2008-2009 season. Weiss was brought in by Brave Dragons owner Boss Wang, a volatile and NBA-obsessed steel mill owner, who sought Weiss’s expertise as a means to form the Brave Dragons into an NBA style team.

As the season progresses, Weiss’s efforts to install an NBA style offense and teach progressive basketball skills (primarily individual decision making and awareness within the system) are regularly short circuited by Boss Wang’s kneejerk insistence on running the team through endless conditioning drills and demanding the team adhere to Wang’s latest backwards whims on how to be more like former and present NBA legends like Michael Jordan and Steve Nash (which always seem to boil down to being more aggressive and initiating physical contact with opponents).

Weiss is repeatedly told that his methods are inappropriate for Chinese players in large part because of the widely held belief that Chinese players are genetically inferior to players in other basketballing nations. Correspondingly, Chinese players are chosen for advancement and trained based on crude measures of physical growth potential rather than technical excellence or understanding of the game.

Boss Wang and his deputy, Liu Tie, explain to Weiss the conventional wisdom that the only way the Brave Dragons and Chinese players in general will achieve basketball superiority is by enduring intense physical exercise that will toughen them up and make them stronger. 

At several points Weiss (and his tactics and philosophies) are relegated far down the line of authority while Wang and Liu Tie manage and coach the team.  In lieu of Weiss’s NBA-light tactics and playing philosophy, Wang and Tie spend practice forcing the players to run until exhaustion and screaming at the players for any perceived lack of toughness or agression.

The result is predictable. During the games the Chinese players are completely lost and chaotic. The Brave Dragons rely on a revolving cast of foreign players, including former NBA player Bonzi Wells, to initiate offensive production amidst the unstructured chaos. Wells and the other foreign players are horrified at the lack of coherent philosophy and sociopathic behaviors of Boss Wang and his subordinates. Wang’s draconian methods come to a boil when he punches various players and staff members in several different incidents throughout the season.

This struggle between professional sporting intellect and deeply ingrained cultural and sporting cognitive biases should sound familiar to soccer fans and constituents in the United States. I still can’t believe my eyes when something like the opinions in this piece  are published as acceptable analysis. Blah blah blah, we just don’t have the players; we have to scrap out games against WORLD SUPERPOWERS!!! (who happened to have finished last in their groups at WC 2010) like Italy and France.  

Anyone who watched Caleb Porter’s U-23 team take on Mexico should feel a real hot streak of skepticism towards this “We’re the underdog and that’s just how it is” line of thinking. Our guys went at a very talented Mexico U-23 team and showed the senior team how it should be done. I have no reservations stating that we could have achieved a similar if not better result against Italy with the U-23 squad that was on the field last Wednesday against Mexico.

Altidore and Dempsey aren’t working to recover possession? Fine, bring in Gyau, Agudelo, or Adu who all showed commitment to pressuring and tracking the Mexicans all over the field. Bradley and Edu won’t close down Pirlo? Bring in Diskerud, Corona, and Morales who were right on top of the talented Mexican central midfielders when they received the ball.

It’s hard to say whether the U-23s who played against Mexico are the best American players eligible for the age group or whether the same team will be on the field during Olympic qualification. What is for sure is that none of these U-23 roster members tasted the champagne development curricula of places like Barcelona or Ajax. Many of them came up through the same dysfunctional American system that produced the core of the senior team.

The takeaway is that Porter’s philosophy and his ability to communicate to his players cuts through all the noise about the limitations of “American soccer culture” or the established player pool. The only thing stopping us from producing teams and players of high footballing quality is ourselves and our inability to see past the cognitive biases and wrongheaded “conventional wisdom” about our shortcomings as a footballing nation.

The evolution we’ve been waiting for and that Klinsmann has been describing in the future tense is happening right now with the U-23’s under Porter. Porter has successfully implemented the style and philosophy Klinsmann has identified as a goal but failed to produce. Klinsmann’s product is becoming indistinguishable from the status quo of American soccer.

Is Klinsmann’s situation a case similar to Weiss’s, where his expertise is caged by structural and systemic factors? The mediocre national team performances compared to the inspirational and progressive performance of the U-23’s suggest otherwise. While I’m sure there are some factors that Klinsmann could point to as roadblocks for implementing his philosophy and style of play (marketing pressure, agents, etc…), one of the benefits of being a national team coach is a high degree of discretion in choosing the philosophy, player pool, and technical staff.  Unlike Porter, Klinsmann has failed to utilize this discretion to demonstrate a cohesive and progressive footballing product.

Unfortunately, it is beginning to appear that Klinsmann’s methods are skewed by a sense that his value is closer to a psychological guru as opposed to progressive leader. After the Italy game, Klinsmann identified the primary value of the win as a means to elevate the MNT player’s self-confidence when playing against “established” teams like Italy (Reminder: Italy took last in their Group in WC 2010) as if some adolescent lack of confidence was the real roadblock. Did the U.S. players look real confident when they were totally bunkered for the last 20 minutes or when Pirlo was dropping dime after dime over our back line and our central midfielders dropped 20 yards off of him?

What about when the U.S. beat Spain in the 2009 Confederations Cup with a team consisting of many of the same players as the Italy squad? Shouldn’t that have been some sort of cathartic confidence boost for the consistency of our game to levels previously unseen?

By contrast, Porter’s post game comments identified the system that he implemented with the U-23s and praised the players’ ability to execute the tasks required to impose the system and philosophy on the opponent. Porter’s leadership is rooted in the system that he has chosen and implemented. The players are charged with executing the tasks he has communicated to them as a means to achieve collective superiority. The players’ commitment and collective buying into Porter’s philosophy was an inspirational display of the potential of U.S. Soccer. They have been chosen because of their abilities to work within the system and they did so admirably against Mexico.

Confidence isn’t gained by getting lucky every couple of years against more storied footballing nations. It comes from implementing a successful philosophy and rehearsing the system until it’s down cold. If a coach cannot initiate this by communicating a set of coherent, cohesive principles and making hard decisions to see that those principles are carried out, the cracks of incoherence and lack of a unified understanding start to show and the system starts to fall apart.  

Mar 06, 20120 notes
Play
Mar 02, 20121 note

February 2012

8 posts

Artisans and Dealmakers

There’s an inherent tension between artisans and marketers. From farmers decrying the speculative influence of traders during the early days of the Chicago mercantile exchange to modern musicians fighting with their labels over record revenues, it’s a strange and volatile process figuring out what’s what between those who make and those who sell.

MLS is no exception.

Professional football is a commercial endeavor like many others. A product is sold to consumers to generate revenues which are sometimes enough to cover expenses. Some teams are more effective at this than others. The question I feel we must answer sooner rather than later is whether MLS’s unique structure and business model is causing a stagnation or decline in our ability to perform the footballing craft at the highest levels? Ken Sweda’s passionate analysis of the state of our highest soccer institutions, the USSF and MLS, helped to sharpen my thoughts on this question.

Daniel Coyle’s research into the makings of elite athletes/musicians/institutions reveals an intuitive but easy to overlook insight: The institutions he observed all fostered elite talent using a similar loop of specific instruction followed by experience, failure, reflection and ultimate mastery. There are some key ingredients to this recipe: competent, focused instruction and leadership combined with diligent work that underscores an intense desire to learn. The successful people and institutions Coyle observes aren’t born with all of the tools necessary to be amazing. Rather, their success is fostered and developed through years of trial and error and adaptation to the changing demands of increasingly challenging instruction and opposition.

This process can be messy and unpredictable. It requires flexibility, patience, and commitment from all parties involved.  Repeated failure is often necessary to learn, adapt, and improve. It can be boring and frustrating for all involved. When done properly, however, the ultimate results can be inspirational examples of the potential for human achievement. It is a stark contrast to the idea that the same level of quality can be achieved immediately by making a “deal” for the services of a player or manager.

This process also requires considerable dedicated resources. Instructors don’t work for free and schools don’t build themselves.

The example on the tip of world football’s tongue is the FC Barcelona Cantera, which has received great attention in the wake of FCB’s recent footballing dominance. FCB invests significant resources into its youth development with the understanding that the investments will provide a return in the form of successful professional footballers. This approach has been wildly successful as a tool for shaping youth players into successful first teamers as well as generating transfer fees from the sale of players. Most importantly, the knowledge and professional training of the game passed down to each Cantera generation serves to institutionalize the successful footballing principles upon which Barca has achieved its current renaissance.

Of course, the FCB cantera isn’t perfect and there are plenty of examples where the investment does not result in an economic or footballing benefit to the club. These missteps are a tolerable risk for FCB. The club accepts them as an inevitable aspect of its dedication to education and training its skilled tradesman in house rather than relying on purchasing players on the open market to form the core of its squad. Players are bought to fills gaps in the process rather than shape the identify and core composition of the team.

As FCB youth coach Albert Benaiges describes it in Graham Hunter’s Barca, the process is akin to artisan tradesman practicing and learning a craft:

“It’s a good model but you have to be aware of the small important details. It’s a bit like cooking—if you don’t know how much salt and spices to use, you’ll never make a good stew.”

The business of FC Barcelona is an obvious pre-requisite to the existence of the Cantera. The Cantera cannot operate without the substantial resources FCB generates through television rights contracts, tickets and jersey sales, and sponsorships. But those economic benefits don’t generate automatically. Without the Cantera producing footballers of the highest quality, there’d be no Champions League TV money or Messi jersey sales to keep the wheels turning and the lights on. FCB’s economic engine is its ability to instill the skill, philosophy, and leadership in its players that are on display every time the team plays a game.

The artisan coaches and footballers are responsible for producing and honing the valuable product that is displayed on the field during every FCB match. Without them, FCB president Sandro Rosell would have a very different economic reality and a very different pitch to make to sponsors and potential business partners.

Rosell’s mandate is to ensure Barca’s economic viability or else the club could quickly fall into disrepair and insolvency. Glasgow Rangers recent entrance into administration is a stern reminder that football clubs are not exempt from financial realities. Just as a industrial business is often forced to liquidate its most valuable assets (inventory, physical plants, office buildings) in a bankruptcy, Rangers will likely face the prospect of having to sell its most valuable assets, its players, to satisfy creditors and regain solvency.  This will likely have significant negative effects of the footballing product that Rangers produces.

Within this discussion, there is grass roots sentiment in the U.S. that MLS is doing it wrong. There are some very visible differences between MLS’s business model and those of the top teams/leagues around the world. MLS does not promote/relegate within a sanctioned multi-tier system. “Expansion” MLS teams gain entry to MLS by virtue of their owners becoming investors in the league’s ownership entity rather than by achieving successful results at a lower tier. The terms of this transaction subject the owners and players to MLS’s centralized rules and procedures with regards to how players are developed, retained, and compensated.

These can be hugely frustrating for sophisticated observers of successful leagues throughout the world that seem to be structured nearly diametrically opposite to MLS. The question, astutely raised by many of these observers, is whether MLS’s unique format and rules is serving to enrich and evolve the footballing craft in the U.S.? Further, is it possible that the current incarnation of MLS and its affiliates is limiting the evolution and adaptation of the game in the U.S.?

To answer this question I believe we need to be aware of the tension between craft and business; artisans and dealmakers.

MLS in its current state was founded and cultivated by dealmakers and marketers. MLS founder Alan Rothenberg was first exposed to professional soccer as a young attorney after a client purchased an ill-fated NASL team. Rothenberg went on to become president of the USSF and the leader of MLS’s venture to become sanctioned as the sole top level soccer league in the U.S. Rothenberg’s expansive vision of the game’s potential in the U.S. helped the 1994 World Cup to become the highest attended World Cup in history.

Current MLS commissioner Don Garber came from the NFL with a marketing background and very little exposure to soccer. His mandate was to ensure the economic security of a wobbly league that had been forced to contract a year before his tenure began. Following his election as MLS commissioner, he formed Soccer United Marketing, a marketing venture owned by MLS (which is owned collectively by the team owners). Essentially, Soccer United Marketing’s business philosophy isn’t so much to sell the MLS, but to sell soccer in the U.S.

SUM’s “about us” profile features the somewhat humorously structured and vaguely Orwellian claim that it is the “preeminent soccer business company in North America.” SUM operates by purchasing soccer “properties” —the rights to television broadcast, sponsorship, and marketing opportunities—related to a lion’s share of professional soccer played and watched within the United States. SUM’s “clients” include the MLS, the USSF (primarily the men’s and women’s national teams), and the FMF, including the Mexican national teams and Mexican Primera Division.

“Clients” is in quotes because the nature of SUM’s business creates a far more symbiotic relationship than a typical principal-agent style client relationship, especially with regards to SUM’s relationship with the USSF. For example, SUM paid the USSF over $5 million dollars for the property rights to the USSF’s national team games in 2010-2011. Ever wonder why the USSF and MLS have a bunch of the same sponsors? It’s most likely because SUM sells the “properties” in bundles to sponsor businesses i.e. Allstate might want to just sponsor the USSF for $2 million but SUM might sweeten the deal by throwing in the MLS sponsorship rights for an extra $500k or visa versa. Ever wonder why Mexico seems to be playing quite a few friendlies in the U.S.? Mexico is a huge draw in the U.S. and Mexico’s U.S. tours likely generate big revenues for all parties involved, including SUM. 

The amounts in excess of what SUM paid for the property rights that it receives from broadcast rights, sponsors, etc. gets distributed to MLS owners since they actually own the cash flows that SUM generates. It’s likely that these distributions are what keep most MLS teams solvent from year to year.

SUM’s financial success, along with the MLS-NBC broadcast contract, will likely be held as Garber’s defining achievements as league commissioner. With SUM, Garber and his executive team have succeeded at least partially in monetizing the idea of soccer, rather than the production of quality soccer players. Most of the MLS owners appear to be in for the long play with the hopes that MLS revenue streams will surge in coming years as soccer becomes more “popular.” The league structure and the SUM revenues wed the owners in a “we’re all in this together” type marriage.

Meanwhile, MLS continues to present an inferior on field product as compared to even some of the world’s less desirable leagues. The league still tends to favor blockbuster deals involving known commodities as a benchmark of legitimacy as opposed to taking pride in the successful development of young American players. Talented young players are regularly sacrificed at the altar of aging European or South American “stars” that are hailed as ambassadors of levels of football we have struggled to produce.

Barcelona takes pride in the fact that most of their first team players learned the game around the corner from the stadium. We try to rationalize signing a foreign DP that is compensated 60 times higher than the 23 year old that played college ball across town.  

Can MLS evolve into something better within the current framework?

During the recent NCAA College Soccer season I saw three teams—Akron, Creighton, and UCLA— possess and press better than any MLS team I’ve ever watched. All three demonstrated carefully instructed coaching and tactical preparation and creative play to a tune unheard in the MLS. It’s reminiscent of the diversity in tactics and creativity seen at the NCAA football level as opposed to the uniformity of the NFL. The NFL explains that its players are too big and too fast for naïve flirtations with novel formations and silly ideas. The Wildcat offense could NEVER work in the NFL until it did and then every team scrambled to adopt a variation into its playbook.

Of course, American football isn’t played at a professional level outside North America (World League R.I.P.) and NFL players have no World Cup or regional championship to measure up with how the rest of the world plays the game.

We don’t have that luxury in soccer. The footballing world is constantly evolving and searching for ways to achieve dominance. We have near unlimited access to observe how the best in the world play the game week after week. Heck, they even come to our country every summer to show us how it’s done (with SUM selling the broadcast rights to ESPN and FSC!).

My concern is that the mousetrap and coupling created by MLS and SUM’s structures and business dealings have retarded the evolution of the game in the U.S. If you’re a sophisticated coach at the college or professional level that is accustomed to a great deal of discretion in pursuing your vision of how the game should be developed and played, are you sure you want to join the Rube Goldberg apparatus that MLS has become? Are you sure you’ll want to rock the boat with your commitment to creative, technically oriented, possession play? Are you really going to draft that 5’6 enganche that wasn’t invited to the combine and only played in junior college?

Rothenberg and Garber’s contributions to the initialization and economic stabilization of professional soccer in the U.S. are invaluable. However, it’s time for the craft to evolve. I don’t have all (or maybe any) of the answers for how to do this, but I feel comfortable saying that until we focus on using MLS to provide a forum for developing the type of complete players valued not only abroad, but within the most committed MLS fan communities, the league will remain a point of strife. 

Of course, the profit motive looms large. My hope is that a team owner with soft eyes for managerial talent and some patient patriotism will recognize that a superior on field product demonstrated by players developed within the U.S. will work wonders in raising engagement and acceptance of MLS within the American soccer community. The U.S. market for coherent, Made in the U.S.A. high-quality play is likely unlimited. Akron averaged over 4,000 fans a game last season in a city of 200,000 with an amateur team! I suspect the first brave and determined souls to implement such play will not only be financially successful, but also go down as heroes within the U.S. Soccer community.

Feb 17, 20120 notes
John O'Brien on the Footballing Craft

The following articles, written by and about John O’Brien are worth spending some time to absorb:

From The Original Winger:

“Of all the teammates I ever had, John was hands down the most talented. Even as a kid, pre Ajax days, he always played and saw the game slightly differently than everyone else.”

O’Brien’s thoughts on possession in the NY Times during WC 2010:

“A player can try to take the pressure off his teammates by holding the ball, trying to get a throw-in or a free kick. This is necessary and great, but the true magic happens when a group of players decide under pressure that they are not going to give the ball back.”

O’Brien on training with the US after moving to Ajax:

“As an Ajacied (Ajax player) I was no longer an outsider to world soccer. I did not need to rate myself against a standard held on another continent. The standard itself had become internalized. I knew what made a good player and where players fell by the wayside.”

O’Brien on pressuring tactics:

“(Former Dutch and Ajax player) Ronald Koeman once told me it is easier to stop an attack by being closer to the ball than farther away. How simple, how Dutch!”

Feb 14, 20120 notes
Glue

“The midfield is a crucial part of any team. Midfielders are intelligent players who have to think about the team as a whole. They’re selfless players who understand the game better than anyone and the more midfielders you have, the easier it is to slot them into other positions. That’s how they become versatile and that helps us to have smaller squads that are still able to offer more options.”

-Pep Guardiola

Dominant possession football is all about midfielders.

In the U.S., we rue the apparent lack of complete central midfielders as if the raw material just doesn’t exist.

I have no qualifications stating that this attitude and analysis is historically inaccurate and factually incorrect.

Rather than this being a case of the “it just can’t happen here” variety, our failings are that we’ve been unwilling or unable to establish some accepted bedrock concepts for developing and evaluating midfielders, in particular central midfielders. Our philosophy and tactics have historically “worked around” this lack of development at the highest level: Defend frantically in our own third, get the ball out wide quickly, cross the ball towards the strikers in the penalty box, hope for the best.

So, what makes a good midfielder?

Guardiola’s quote reveals one of the major attributes: universality. Busquets can comfortably play defensive midfielder, centerback or even right back. Puyol started out as a right winger and shifts flawlessly between centerback and right back. Messi can play anywhere along the attacking 5/6. This flexibility reveals a critical skill instilled at FCB: a player’s ability to recognize the overall context and responsibilities of each position on the field and act appropriately.

To keep the ball the way any good possession based team does, every player on the field has to understand and implement a set of shared goals and actions. This requires a “selfless” devotion to the stated goals and an understanding that collective adherence to the principles will create a robust, successful system.

From this evolves an understanding of how each player’s actions contribute to the functioning of a system as a whole. Sure, your star player might be able to dribble past 1 or 2 players pretty easily. But if they ignore the opportunity to circulate the ball to a teammate in space and end up losing the ball after deciding to dribble at a 3rd opponent everyone suffers, especially if this takes place in the defensive or central thirds of the field. Teammates have to cover for the turnover and your team is likely going to defend a counterattack.

An understanding of these concepts, or an ability to understand them, is a hard to identify attribute that goes beyond physical skill. Yet this ability acts as both the glue that keeps a system together and the lubricant which keeps it functioning smoothly. This footballing intelligence is what sets apart the serviceable from the elite and developing such intelligence should be at the top of our development agenda in the U.S.

In that spirit, I have provided a suggested “top 5” list of collective tasks when a team is with and without possession of the ball.

With the Ball:

1.       Always be looking for spaces created by the interactions between your system and your opponent’s.

2.       Anticipate the sequence of possession and move into space appropriately (timing is key).

3.       Know your next moves before receiving the ball.

4.       Focus on the quality of your first touch to set up for distribution.

5.       Circulate the ball quickly by identifying your teammate in space and playing an appropriately weighted/located pass.

Without the Ball:

1.       Pressure immediately in packs if the ball is lost (“Swarm” defending)-the player that lost the ball must lead the pack.

2.       Focus your positioning on influencing the player in possession rather than worrying about your “man” a la man to man basketball defense.

3.       Observe the locations of your teammates and be aware of what’s behind you and position accordingly to achieve #2. This is about the angle and distance from the player in possession rather than man marking a la basketball.

4.       The time while the ball is in motion in between a pass and reception is critical; anticipate and react to intercept the ball or place the player receiving under immediate pressure.

5.       Everyone defends. Everyone must be influencing playing options at all times while the opponent is in possession. No one, not even the star forward with the fancy haircut, gets a free ride.

These tasks have an “ickyness” factor to them in that they don’t lend themselves to straightforward measurement or execution (i.e. “He runs slow” or “Just cover your man…”). It’s probably impossible to quantify them at any meaningful level. Further, repeated execution and observation of them verges on the mundane. It’s a lot more exciting to freak out about some 40 yard half volley bomb than whether a player hits the space on time to provide a playing option 100 times in a row.

Yet these types of simple tasks, repeated over and over are the raw material for building a dominant team that can possess the ball under pressure. Do American coaches lay out such tasks and expectations to lay the framework for their philosophy/style? In my experience the answer has been predominantly no with some rare and hopeful exceptions.

Former Dynamo Kyiv manager Valeriy Lobanovskyi  hung lists of demands/tasks in the Dynamo training ground to communicate exactly what he wanted from his team and individual players. These demands were designed to achieve universality. From Jonathan Wilson’s Inverting the Pyramid:

“[Lobanovskyi] wanted his forwards to defend and his backs to attack, and saw no contradiction in the instruction because, to him, attacking and defending were related not to position on the pitch, but possession.”

Lobannovskyi’s methods led Dynamo to win 8 Soviet titles, 6 Soviet Cups, 5 Ukrainian titles, 3 Ukrainian Cups and 2 European Cup-Winners’ Cups.

Are such universal players mythical creatures in the history of U.S. Soccer? Not really, although the last player to demonstrate such a complete skill set at a professional/national team level was probably John O’Brien.  O’Brien grew up in Southern California before signing an amateur contract with Ajax when he was 17. His first touch, field awareness, and passing accuracy allowed him to play various positions and roles. During the U.S. 2002 World Cup run O’Brien shifted between defensive midfielder and left back (where he played with Ajax). O’Brien’s perfectly weighted chip from left back set up the second goal against Mexico, arguably the high point in the U.S. cycle of football development since 1994 (he also scored the first goal against Portugal).

O’Brien suffered serial injury after the 2002 WC and was never able to regain the form he demonstrated with the U.S. in 2002. Had O’Brien remained healthy and continued to emerge as an example of a complete American midfield player, his playing style and skill set would likely have been an extremely visible and valuable reference point for American coaches and players.

Was John O’Brien a once in a generation star whose skill set we can never hope to replicate? I don’t think so. O’Brien went to football “college” at Ajax, one of the best developmental forums in the world. However, his acceptance to Ajax was probably just as much a matter of luck and circumstance than some ordained trajectory due to his individual brilliance. This isn’t to speak poorly of O’Brien’s playing qualities or portray his situation as one of favor rather than merit. Rather, it’s a reflection on the state of our footballing philosophy and education that we’ve historically relied on far away institutions like Ajax and Barcelona to identify and educate players with the skill sets necessary to create such complete players.  

There are players in this country right now that have the potential to exhibit the universality demanded by Guardiola and Lobanovskyi. Some are on MLS benches or playing Division II or NAIA college soccer. Some gave up professional ambitions long ago and still play for fun in Sunday men’s leagues or likewise. Others are just coming into contact with the system and trying to figure out the contradictions and flaws within U.S. Soccer and how to overcome them. Some are told they are “too slow” or “too small” to play professionally or have some other physical attributes that don’t scream ATHLETE! to their local coaches or scouts.

Some of these guys, if given a choice, will choose not to play for the U.S. and avoid the possibility that our undeveloped philosophy and coaching infrastructure will ignore them or try to force them into the “work around” systems that have acted as a crutch in our development for some time now. We are trying to evolve into something better and more sophisticated. To do so we will have to be very clear about our goals and expectations.  

Feb 13, 20121 note
Incremental Change in the Right Direction?

I noticed this link over at the Sounder at Heart blog. Five Seattle Sounders Development Academy players will be on the University of Washington Men’s Soccer roster next season (UW is located in Seattle). Presumably, the Sounders will be making (or have made) Homegrown Player claims on these guys to keep them out of the MLS draft and within the Sounders system during and after college.

The HGP rule appears to be emerging as a mysterious and powerful force in MLS. This article from Goal.com describes the recent twists and not completely transparent turns in the application of the HGP rule.

What struck me about the Sounders article was whether the continuation from a youth development team to a friendly, or even affiliated, college program represents a potential model for better alignment of vertical incentives and continuity for player and personal development. With more and more MLS clubs footing the bill for their development academies, clubs are obviously going to be looking after their HGP players during the college years as they seek a footballing return on their investments into the youth programs.

Attending college can end up being a developmental left turn for a youth player. A whole new set of coaches, environments, and expectations represent a batch of uncertain variables in player and personal development. The main uncertainty on the soccer side is that a college coach will not have a formal incentive to serve a club or player’s developmental goals or may not have the coaching skills to further a player’s development. This can be compounded by a relatively short college season and NCAA restrictions on spring soccer and when players are eligible to join PDL/NPSL summer teams.   

Despite this uncertainty, obtaining a college education can provide multiple soccer and non-soccer benefits and its cultural importance in the US is not unfounded. A balanced on and off field education can foster a player’s ability to think critically and act professionally as they mature during the college age years. Higher eduction/a college degree can also become especially important for young MLS players given modest potential starting salaries and uncertain length of playing careers.  

That said, there are some serious flaws in our higher education system and the Divsion I college filter cuts off not only playing careers, but professional development opportunities for people who’s learning style/intelligence doesn’t fit nicely within the higher education mousetrap. The college admissions and curricula process will likely remain far outside the influence of MLS clubs no matter how cozy they get with college soccer programs.

UW taking 5 Sounders players doesn’t represent a complete and perfect alignment of incentives, but it could be a step in the right direction by creating some linkages and alignment of incentives between MLS clubs and college programs. Unfortunately, there are plenty of thorny and backwards NCAA rules that go along with all this which add a significant limit to the benefit of these types of changes.

Despite the challenges, I’m a big fan of incremental changes within the existing framework to make things better. I’d love to hear feedback on potential possibilities or roadblocks for the continuation and refinement of the college/club partnership.     

Feb 09, 20120 notes
Creating the Field

I’ve gotten a few responses regarding my thoughts on Klinsmann’s use of fitness training in the recent USMNT camps and how it relates to his playing philosophy. My friend and former teammate Dillon provided a very insightful comment to the piece (thanks again for commenting Dillon!):

“It has been my understanding that the emphasis on nutrition and fitness is because Klinsmann prefers to play high pressure 4-3-3. Even without pressing 3/4 of the field, a 4-3-3 requires superior fitness to cover the gaps in midfield. My understanding was this was the main reason for his emphasis on nutrition, fitness, two-a-days, etc. Which makes sense.”

This does make sense. If you have a certain way of playing in mind you want to make damn sure that the players have the physical tools to execute it. Unfortunately, the MNT’s recent performances against Venezuela and Panama suggest that the physical preparation is not being driven or complemented by detailed tactical instruction on how to carry out the “proactive/pressing” strategy Klinsmann has referenced.

By comparison, I’ve included below some images from the recent MNT game against Panama followed by images of FC Barcelona’s recent Copa Del Rey game vs. Real Madrid to better identify and describe my concerns with Klinsmann’s management of the team.

Some background: Until the Panama game, Klinsmann had deployed the MNT in 4-1-4-1/4-2-3-1 ish formations. The U.S. demonstrated vast improvement in the central midfield once Klinsmann deployed Jose Francisco Torres in the #8 interior midfield role in the games against Costa Rica and Mexico. Torres’ control in tight spaces, decision making, and immediate pressing to recover the ball worked to great effect in taking control of the matches against Mexico and Costa Rica. Unfortunately, Torres suffered an injury after the Costa Rica game and hasn’t played since. Since Torres’ injury, Klinsmann has chosen not to deploy a midfielder with a similar skill set and the MNT’s performances have been underwhelming.

Against Panama, Klinsmann shifted formation to a 4-4-2, with Chris Wondolowski and CJ Sapong deployed in striker roles. Benny Feilhaber, whose creative performance against Venezuela in the interior midfield role was also somewhat inconsistent, was benched as an unused substitute for the Panama game.

After taking the lead against Panama, there was a stretch of about 25 minutes where Panama controlled the game and should have scored at least one goal. There was a theme to how Panama developed its scoring chances: the Panamanian midfield players were allowed generous amounts of time and space in the central third of the field allowing them to play weighted through balls behind the United States back line. Let’s take a look how this happened:

 

Here, the US has just lost the ball from a misdirected pass. The Panamanian player is given time to dribble and attacks the space in between Jermaine Jones and Ricardo Clark. Rather than head towards the player with the ball, Graham Zusi and  Clark direct their movement toward the US Goal. Brek Shea’s positioning leaves him completely unable to influence the play, leaving Jones as the sole midfield player to pressure the Panamanian player in possession. Jones is unable to close down the space and Panama is able to continue to build their attack. Also notice the huge gap behind and to the right of Jones. The back line is retreating, leaving large spaces for Panama to run into to.

Here’s Barca against Real Madrid. Madrid has the ball in a similar position as Panama. Some immediate differences jump out. 4 Barca midfield players are within 10 yards of the ball, if not less. 8 of the Barca outfield players are on the ball-side half of the field. The margin for error for the player in possession is tiny. Xavi has left Lass Diarra all alone in the middle of the field but Ramos can’t get him the ball because Xavi’s angle has cut off the passing lane and Ramos doesn’t have the time necessary to set up for a chip to Lass. The Barca players are focused on the current point of action, the player with the ball, making sure he is under immense, collective pressure while cutting off available passing lanes. Also notice how high the Barca back line is playing, keeping the playing area RM have to work with very small. This high line only works because the Barca midfield is pressuing the heck out of RM. If the RM midfield players get time on the ball in the center of the field and are allowed to set up killer passes towards Christiano Ronaldo or Gonzalo Higuain Barca’s high line will get ripped apart.

 

Back to the US. Here, Panama has moved the ball from the right side of the field into the center just outside the US defensive third. Jermaine Jones is about 20 yards off the central Panamanian player when he receives the pass from his right. As a result, the Panamanian player is given huge amounts of time and space, and able to set up a nicely weighted chipped ball behind the US defense. This happened several times in the span of about 15 minutes. Were it not for poor Panamanian finishing/great goalkeeping by Nick Rimando, the US could have conceded at least 2 goals as a result of these balls being played through.

 

Here’s Barca. Notice the similarities between the positioning of the RM players and the Panama players in this image and the prior one. Immediately evident is that the RM player, Xabi Alonso cannot turn to face goal when receiving the ball because of immediate pressure from the Barca midfield. All of the Barca players are moving towards Alonso to destroy his playing options. Alonso’s pinpoint passing is a nightmare for opposing teams and Barca is all over him to make sure he doesn’t have time and space to set up a killer pass.

 

Here it is again! This time Panama has just taken a throw in on the right hand touchline and the ball is played back to the throwing player. The player who has just taken the throw-in is given time and space to pick his next pass, which goes to the central player. Again, Jones is about 20 yards out of the play. Wondolowski is moving slowly towards the play and fails to influence the playing options. The result? Panama plays the ball central, chips over the top and the US team is forced to pull out all the stops to keep the ball out of its net.

 

Barca is a higher up the field here, but the principle is the same. As soon as the the RM player receives the ball he is under pressure the players are working collectively to limit his playing options. Here, Xavi is tight on Kaka with Pedro looking to cut the angle or pounce if the ball is played to Sergio Ramos at right back. The other Barca players are moving towards the ball, especially Busquets who looks a little out of position here given the space Xabi Alonso has. Busquets is a little too close to the back line but is quickly pushing forward to balance out the shape and be ready if Alonso receives the ball.

What about when the US was in possession of the ball? With only 2 central midfielders, neither of which is an “enganche” player in the mold of Jose Torres, Xavi or even Feilhaber, the US was forced to rely on direct passes into Wondolowski and Sapong who were tightly marked by the Panamanian central defenders and rarely strayed into the midfield zone during the game. What was the result for the US? Choppy buildup, intercepted passes, and an inability to take control of the game. For this comparison let’s start off looking at Barca:

Here, Barca have recovered the ball in their defensive third. Pique is in possession and RM is pressuring. However, Barca have a numerical advantage, 8 vs. 6 within the playing area of where Pique is in possession and Cesc Fabregas’ position just below the midfield circle. The Barca midfield form triangle passing angles and are deployed evenly up the field. Sanchez and Pedro are spread high and wide up the field to occupy the RM outside defenders. Busquets is located to Pique’s left, basically in centerback position. Pique has several playing options to choose from and ultimately plays to ball to Busquets, who takes a touch and passes to Fabregas. Fabregas has positioned himself in the space “in between the lines” at the bottom of the circle. Having found the space, Fabregas receives and turns and Barca are in business transitioning to an attacking posture.

 

Here’s the US in a somewhat similar situation. Now, it’s hard to make the comparison purely from the photos because the camera angle and distance is different and you can’t see as much of the field. However, based on the US formation and the result of this play the diagnosis is pretty evident. Jones receives the ball and turns with some time and space. Rico Clark and Zusi, positioned center-right and wide-right, are to Jones’ right out of frame and Shea is to his left out of frame. Wondolowki and Sapong, the two “target forwards” are checking towards Jones from their striker positions with defenders on their backs. Jones plays a long, firm pass to Sapong who has difficulty controlling the pass resulting in a broken build up from the US. Even with the tighter camera angle you can see two potential spaces for US players to move into and create numerical advantages: to Jones’ right and left at 45 degree angles. Either of these locations would have provided a more secure pass and gradual build up opportunity as opposed to relying on a bullet 30 yard pass from Jones to Sapong who has a defender on his back.    

The lack of numerical balance in central midfield in the 4-4-2 formation is a partial cause of these issues. But the larger problem is that it appears that the MNT players do not have a collective understanding of how the team will recover and distribute the ball as a system. These problems were showing in each of the friendly games leading up to Venezuela and Panama. Remember, these sequences occurred in the first half of the Panama game when the players should presumably have relatively fresh legs.

On the other side, FC Barcelona is not the only team that is currently able to do these things well. Athletic Bilbao, under the leadership of Marcelo Bielsa, is exemplary at closing down space and shutting down players with the ball.  Bilbao’s relatively quicker transitions to attack as compared to FC Barcelona provide a different look to the space/numerical superiority game Barca executes at a more deliberate pace.

There’s still time to address this stuff before World Cup qualification starts this summer. But these are glaring issues that probably shouldn’t exist if a coach is laying out a coherent approach for their players. Guys like Bielsa and Guardiola obsess over these spacing and positioning issues and hold them as the keys to consistent dominance. If Klinsmann can’t or won’t recognize these issues, we’re in for a bumpy road ahead.

Feb 08, 20120 notes
It was all a Dream...

Some reactions to my Soccernomics critique over at the Sounder at Heart blog (thank again to Dave @ Sounder at Heart for posting the link!) provide an interesting continuation into the larger debate about the appropriate role for “hard” quantitative data in forming an effective philosophy/strategy.

I’ve observed several folks over the past couple of years argue that American numeracy and statistical analysis will be a big asset for evolving U.S. Soccer into a more successful enterprise in terms of footballing results. I don’t doubt that companies like Prozone and Match Analysis can provide value in managing and organizing observable data for football managers and decision makers.

The important question, however, is whether such analyses and data compilation will provide some obscured, previously unknown insight into the game that can become a bedrock principle for success. The allure ofthe Moneyball approach to sports analysts is that hidden within the blathering noise of archaic and obsolete sports intelligentsia lie hidden diamonds for those with enough statistical acumen to mine and exploit to great effect.      

For such opportunities to exist, someone has to believe in the blathering and abide by its core principles. In Moneyball it’s the ageing scouts who light up when talking about a player’s “hose” of a strong arm or aesthetically pleasing swing. According to Soccernomics, football is “barely distinguishable from baseball.” In Soccernomics, the status quo villains are idiot managers that pay top dollar for blonde center forwards and recent European Cup winners but don’t hire relocation consultants. If only clubs would start hiring more MBA grads, the Soccernomics authors explain, then some amount of efficiency and reason could be imposed in the footballing world.

The theme is fairly straightforward: The collective failures of cognitive biases and human misunderstanding of causes can be addressed and reversed by relying on past quantitative observations to make future decisions and predict future outcomes.  

First, let me start with where I agree with the Moneyball/Soccernomics arguments: human cognitive biases are pervasive in footballing culture like in baseball. Here’s a link to a quick and clear explanation of many observed human cognitive biases. The gist of what’s meant by “cognitive bias” is that our human brains, the hardware by which we make all of our decisions, have some wiring which can lead us to misidentify causes of things and resist alternative explanations.

You see examples of these biases all the time in U.S. Soccer, from anonymous fan comments (“our best athletes don’t play soccer…”) to comments from the very top.

So, what can we do to address this? Some numbers folks, like my new friend sammysounder at Sounder at Heart blog, argue that the stats will illuminate the way forward and that “feel good philosophies” aren’t very valuable. Others, like the excellent Sarah Rudd at On Football present a less conclusory and more contextual approach to the presentation of statistical analyses.

There are two major issues with hanging our developmental hats on relying on statistics to become an initiator of a successful footballing philosophy:

1.       Observed past performance is not necessarily predictive of future outcomes.

2.       Measurements can be influenced by the same human cognitive biases and shortcomings that the analyses are designed to overcome.      

Remember, what statisticians are doing here is attempting to overcome perceived shortcomings in our human “computers” by using statistical principles and technology (primarily stat crunching computers). Are the maths and compruters really better than what we have banging around in our thick skulls? I think the answer is sometimes maybe and sometimes no. It is HUGELY important, however, to discern which is which and keep things in sharp context.

Some context: First, soccer and baseball are very different. Baseball is far more linear, discrete, and structured than football. Generally, this structure makes baseball easier to quantify than the organized chaos of a football match. Can you quantify whether a football player is positioned correctly or providing sufficient instructions to his teammates? How about whether a pass is weighted correctly or even whether the “right” pass is played? What about the defensive trajectory a player takes when trying to recover the ball?  Further, if these can be quantified, what value does that quantification provide us in predicting future outcomes?

The best football thinkers in the history of the game have recognized that a football game consists of millions of complex interactions all happening simultaneously. What’s their secret to managing this chaos to successful outcomes? Look around and it becomes evident pretty quickly that their success started by forming a philosophy and beliefs about the game that they were able to effectively implement.

For some of the biggest historical proponents of using statistical analysis in football, starting with Valeriy Lobanovski up to Arsene Wenger, successul usage of statisitics started with implementing a philosophy to set the context for using statistics to measure players’ effectiveness in meeting a team’s collective goals. When asked about his usage of statistics, Wenger points out that the numbers are useless without context. Lobanovski pioneered the usage of statistics to establish whether a team was meeting goals set within the context of his established philosophy which he went to great lengths to communicate to his players. The stats are used as metrics, not initiators.

What about the current best of the best, FC Barcelona? Conveniently, Graham Hunter just put out an excellent book called Barca: The Making of the Greatest Team in the World. The book provides some extremely informative and valuable information for up and coming footballing outfits like the U.S.

Charly Rexach has held a variety of roles at FC Barcelona spanning from successful player to manager. He is often mentioned in the same breath as Cruyff or Guardiola but does not enjoy the same visibility. However, his steady contributions to FCB may go down as being just as, if not more, valuable as Cruyff’s and Guardiola’s.

In Hunter’s book, it’s Rexach who provides some of the most detailed accounts of why FCB looks like it does today. Speaking of the circumstances he and Cruyff faced when the duo were installed as FCB first team coaches:

“We inherited a culture at the camp Nou where the fans whistled and jeered at a defender if he passed the ball back to the keeper, or at a winger if he reached the byeline but didn’t cross the ball – whether there was anybody there to take advantage of the chance or not.

“Our original task was to find and sign players who had the correct philosophy and skill set and to educate the ones we inherited, but a by-product was that we educated our fans. Everything flowed once we taught everyone that there was a baseline philosophy and we would not bend from it.”

Rexach became FCB assistant coach to Cruyff as head coach in 1988. Prior to their arrival, FCB had won La Liga twice in 28 years and Real Madrid were enjoying a ruling hegemony. Upon instilling their footballing philosophy, Cruyff and Rexach led FCB to win La Liga four times between 1991 and 1994 and won the European Cup in 1992 with the original “Dream Team,” led by then captain Pep Guardiola.

To distill the possession based, high pressing philosophy now synonymous with FC Barcelona, Cruyff and Rexach looked to what worked in the past: Rinus Michel’s Dutch Total Football teams of the 1970s (on which Cruyff was a player) and the Hungarian teams of the 1950s.  

What were the player philosophies and skill sets valued by Cruyff and Rexach? The ability to press, recognize space and circulate the ball quickly and accurately using at most one or two touches. Can these traits be quantified? Certain aspects of each can be. But the point is that without the unbending philosophy installed by Cruyff and Rexach, there’d be no reason to place importance on measuring them.

There’s no inherent unified theory that guaranteed FCB’s success. Cruyff and Rexach made a reasoned choice and stuck to it. Guardiola, a slow and skinny cantera product that wasn’t pegged to be a star by most, fit Cruyff’s system perfectly with his exceptional first touch, passing accuracy, and ability to read the game. Cruyff plucked him from the FCB third team to feature at the heart of the Dream Team midfield. The “midgets” of Xavi, Iniesta, and Messi don’t defy expectations merely because they’re smaller than how elite midfielders and strikers are “supposed” to look, they each have elite first touches and decision making capabilities which they learned to near perfection within the FCB system.    

Barca is packed full of comments supporting the theme from a variety of FCB personnel that the adoption and effective implementation and adaptation of the Cruyff/Rexach philosophy throughout all levels of the FCB structure is core to FCB’s current success. Is this all a ruse? Is Guardiola playing Oz to a team of stat crunchers behind the scenes at FCB that are really pulling the levers?

Guardiola’s decision to sell Samuel Eto’o and Zlatan Ibrahimovic would certainly suggest otherwise. Both are supernatural athletes and prolific goal scorers at the peak of their careers. Both are off the charts in several high profile individual statistical categories and the sale of both cost FCB financially. Guardiola made it clear that it was his decision to remove them from the team after he’d made up his mind that they were not compatible with the system. In their stead, David Villa was brought in. His flexibility and willingness to adapt his game to the FCB philosophy has solidified his place as one of Spain’s all-time great attacking players and contributed to FCB’s La Liga and Champions League victories. His goal-scoring impact was not as great as Eto or Ibrahimovich, but his commitment to the system of the team combined with his opportunistic goal scoring kept him a regular place in FCB’s lineup until his injury in the Club World Cup last December.

Is Guardiola infallible and above the wrath of normal cognitive biases? Absolutely not and he’d probably be the first to admit that. In fact, Ibrahimovic’s purchase is probably an example of placing too much weight on Ibrahimovic’s past successes as an indicator of future performances. However, Guardiola’s unique understanding of the game is based on fluid functioning of the 11 players performing as a whole system. This understanding is built on years of successful implementation of the system and similar observations of what doesn’t work, both as a player and coach.  He trusts his personal “computer” and the coaching team he has assembled to think clearly about what player traits will serve the system he that has been cultivated at FCB. Individual and team statistics are likely used as a metric to understand whether the philosophy is being implemented effectively but the true initiator of success comes from deeply held beliefs held by Guardiola, Cruyff and Rexach.

There is risk in being so bold. But that’s why these guys get paid the big bucks. The risks have paid off and Guardiola, Cruyff, and Rexach are heralded as footballing legends and FCB heroes. The fact that such bravery and subtle competence is without precedence in the United States is extremely disappointing. In the U.S., we regard ourselves as thinkers and “doers” of the highest order, yet we still have a hard time looking across the pond to swallow our pride and collectively absorb how it’s done at an historically elite level. The idea that somehow the “numbers” will convey to us some panacea insight that isn’t plainly observable every time FCB is on T.V. is a crutch and a distraction. It’s also another excuse for those within U.S. Soccer to lean on while they fumble to figure out whether possession soccer is “American” enough.

Read More →

Feb 06, 20120 notes
4. Noises from the past and present

I’m embarrassed to say that I didn’t start reading Paul Gardner’s Soccer America Columns until relatively recently. Mr. Gardner’s posts should be required reading for anyone with a genuine interest in the evolution of U.S. Soccer. One of his latest articles, titled “Bouquets and Brickbats for Bruce Arena” should be framed and preserved as a near perfect reflection of the current state of American footballing philosophy.

His thoughts on Klinsmann’s obsession with player fitness and nutrition as a window to his philosophical approach to the game are a bitter pill to swallow for those (myself included) who had high hopes for the Klinsmann regime. I have to say I find this aspect of Klinsmann’s approach pretty bizarre. It reeks of a Potemkin Silver Bullet philosophy that flits high above the messy depths of where a true philosophy and style is instilled.

Klinsmann’s apparent infatuation with the idea that superior “fitness” is the key to achieving dominance isn’t leading to inspiring results. Mr. Gardner’s description of the USMNT’s recent performances is on point: “unconvincing, and barely worth watching.” For those that haven’t read Germany and Bayern Munich defender Phillip Lahm’s key quote regarding Klinsmann’s tenure at Bayern Munich, it is begginging to look more and more prescient:

“We practiced little more than fitness. Tactical things were neglected. The players had to get together before [the games] to discuss how we wanted to play. After six or eight weeks, all players knew it wouldn’t work with Klinsmann. The rest of the season was damage limitation.”

Appropriate attention to fitness is a critical component of any successful football team. But should an obsession with fitness and nutrition analysis be the cornerstone to implementing a successul philosophy as appears to be the case with Klinsmann? Recent results have been underwhelming and “Bradley-esque.”

But what of the road we have traveled? The other half of Mr. Gardner’s article focuses on recent statements by former USMNT and current L.A. Galaxy coach Bruce Arena. First off, back when Bradley was fired and Klinsmann was appointed there was a detectable “screw this” circling of the wagons from guys within U.S. Soccer who weren’t buying into the idea that Klinsmann was going to revolutionize U.S. Soccer. Arena was one of those guys and he continues stoke the fires of his half-baked skepticism: 

 “The American style is what we’ve always said it is and it hasn’t changed. It’s always been that. There was this kind of rumor that all of a sudden we were going to have a team with the great flavor of the Hispanic player and Mexican-Americans — all of that. Do you see any of those on the field right now?”

It’s the old shirky jerky from Arena. Mr. Gardner’s response:

“The opportunity presented to coaches like Arena — indeed, he should be a leader in this — to take a look at the mix of players and styles and come up with something clearly American — is unique. But Arena refuses to see it. Our style is what is it, he says — meaning what?”

Exactly. Klinsmann’s apparent philosophy that mid-career MLS guys can be turned into world beaters by applying the latest, cutting-edge fitness razzle dazzle is midguided and leads to junk on the field. But at least it’s something and at least Klinsmann is pretty transparent about it.

Arena just wallows in the black box wasteland that has dogged our development and kept U.S. Soccer stuck in neutral. “The American style is what we’ve always said it is…” Um, Bruce could you be a little more specifc? This statement is even more condescending than Klinsmann’s insistence that the true flaw in American bred players soccer DNA is that we don’t know how to run or eat right.

For years, guys like Arena have benefited professionally from the ability to get by without having to demonstrate a coherent set of effective ideas. It’s pretty obvious that Arena’s fraternity within U.S. Soccer is rooting for Klinsmann to fail. And if Klinsmann does fail, which looks increasingly likely to happen with every MNT game, there will be another opportunity to evaluate where we’ve come from and where we want to go based on our past sucesses and mistakes. Arena’s shirking act is rarely called out in the press. Mr. Gardner is one of the few established American soccer journalists that is willing to call B.S. when it is warranted.  

The fact is that U.S. Soccer constituents are waking up and organizing. Arena and Klinsmann’s contributions to U.S. Soccer are to be applauded and respected, but this three card monty act needs to stop. Until we have a MNT manager that isn’t afraid to lay a coherent, comprehensive footballing philosophy or that doesn’t rely on wiz-bang fitness gimmicks or similar mis-diagnoses of the root causes of our mediocrity we’ll continue to be stuck in neutral.

Feb 02, 20120 notes
Zombie Ideas: Soccernomics

I stumbled across this Financial Times articles yesterday regarding performance analysis of football managers: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/f340caae-47cd-11e1-b646-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1l9xhfeTc. The article was written by journalist Simon Kuper, who co-authored Soccernomics with Stefan Syzmanski, an economics professor at the University of Michigan.

Kuper’s article starts out with the questionable proposition that markets for players are completely “efficient” due to the fact that players’ performances are viewed in public. He then cites Syzmanski’s findings first published in Soccernomics that, because the player market is “efficient,” the relative wages the clubs pay individual players are a sufficient metric for player quality. Finally, he concludes that a club’s wage bill largely explains where a team will finish in the league.    

According to Kuper and Syzmanksi, the apparent correlation between player wages and team success makes it very difficult to determine what contribution a manager makes. They attempt to make this determination by evaluating a manager’s success against the relative size of a team’s wage bill as compared to other teams throughout the league. So, the author’s claim that Paul Sturrock, who managed Southend to the top of English League Two despite the league’s 9th highest wage bill, should be considered the same caliber as top managers in the Premier League.

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Feb 01, 20120 notes

January 2012

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Jan 30, 20121 note
3. Black Swans

                                            

“The British type of football never suited me as a player. It was very much smash it up the pitch and play the percentages. The only percentage I was interested in was possession.”

                                        Brendan Rodgers, Manager,  Swansea City A.F.C.

Our shared language and the visibility of the Barclay’s Premier League helped create an appearance for many in the U.S. that the football played in the Premier League represents the cutting edge of progress in the game. Since 2005, the MLS has essentially formalized this perception by establishing the annual All Star Game format where the progress of the MLS is measured against a visiting Premier League team. Further, the most popular destinations for high profile U.S. players like Landon Donavan, Clint Dempsey, and Tim Howard have been English clubs. 

The underlying assumption and conclusion was fairly clear: England does it better than us; we should be more like England and send our best players to England.

This conventional wisdom often overshadows  a more informative debate and illuminating history of English football. Since its inception in 1992, the explosion of the Premier League and the foreign capital and interest it has attracted has made it the focal point of world football for the last 20 years. The Premier League’s infancy coincided with the closing chapter of Charles Hughes tenure as the English F.A.’s director of education and coaching. Hughes held this role from 1983-1994, leaving as his legacy the institutionalization of the glaringly flawed ideal that possession football was objectively inferior to a style of play that moved the ball forward as quickly as possible. English journalist Jonathan Wilson provides an excellent description of the Hughes era in his book, Inverting the Pyramid, from which I’ve borrowed heavily for the following summary.

Hughes tenure began just as pre-Premier League Liverpool, managed by Bob Paisley and Bill Shankly, and Nottingham Forest, managed by Brian Clough, were achieving consistent European success using “continental” possession based philosophies and  tactics. Hughes, apparently unimpressed with the Liverpool’s and Notthingham’s successful philosophies, published and institutionalized his theories that goals were created from random happenings of chance dictated by a predictable ratio of shots to goals scored.  Like a person buying additional lottery tickets, a team increased the percentages that they would score a goal by putting the ball into the opponents defensive third as often and quickly as possible according to Hughes.

Like his ideological predecessor Charles Reep, Hughes justified his conclusions using embarrassingly selective statistics, flawed logic, and xenophobic understanding of the evolution of the game. The rotten fruits of Hughes’ flawed philosophies were harvested during Euro ’92 when England was eliminated during the group stage and the 1994 World Cup for which England failed to qualify.

The legacy of Hughes’ ideas inflects the contemporary debate in England and, by association as our predominant footballing cultural and philosophical reference point, the United States. The argument reads something like a mad libs puzzle:

“ _______________ (Possession/4-3-3/Passing out of the back) like __________________ (F.C. Barcelona/Spain/Ajax) would never work for a  __________________ (Mid-low table Premier League/Major League Soccer/NCAA Division I) team. The __________________ (British/American/American College) game is too ____________ (Fast/Physical/Aggressive) for a ________________ (British/MLS/College) team to play like that. The only reason ______________ (F.C. Barcelona/Spain/Ajax) can play like that is because all of their players were ______________ (impoverished street kids/sons of former professionals/one-of-a kind phenoms) who spent thousands of hours playing ______________ (street football in Brazilian slums/at an inhumane brainwashing academy like La Masia/Ajax Academy). That’s how they all learn to ____________ (dive/cheat/properly control a 15 yard pass). And besides, in ____________ (British/American) culture, we value ________________ (hard work/impatience/violent mediocrity) way too much to ever teach our teams to play like that so that we could actually ____________________ (win a World Cup/win a European Championship/not struggle against third world Central American national teams). “ 

The overarching theme of this argument is that there is something foreign and untoward about focusing on the skills and tactics needed to effectively play possession football. Into this debate comes Swansea, a small Welsh Club playing in the Premier League for the first time in any Welsh Club’s history. Rodgers, Swansea’s manager since 2010, demands Swansea build from the back in an attempt to maintain possession and impose their philosophy on opponents. Swansea’s philosophy has produced sensational (albeit inconsistent) results. They beat Arsenal 3-2 in a game they controlled and put on a show of passing and possession to secure an away draw against Liverpool. After the game, Liverpool’s fans remarkably applauded Swansea as they left the field.

Unlike the “big” premier league clubs (especially Arsenal), whose “foreign” manager or players and metropolitan locations make them easy fodder for the “it can’t be done here” argument, Rodgers and most of his key players are from the United Kingdom and team is located in an isolated Welsh coastal town. Swansea’s focal points are Englishmen Leon Britton, a 5’5 midfielder and Nathan Dyer, a mercurial 5’3 winger who provides the unpredictable “Messi factor” to Swansea’s deliberate passing build up.    

Swansea’s nickname and crest is an almost too convenient (and somewhat hyperbolic) segue for characterizing the team’s success as a “Black Swan” event, a theory developed and popularized by Nicolas Nassim Taleb in his 2007 book, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.

Taleb’s usage of the black swan metaphor is derived from the history of European scientific and popular belief that actual black swans were mythical creatures that did not exist in nature due to the observance of only white swans within Europe. Upon European exploration into Australia, black swans were found to be native and common. This observation instantly discredited hundreds of years of what had been accepted as universal knowledge regarding the swan species. 

Taleb’s description of Black Swan theory seeks to explain and understand the limitations of statistical knowledge, human understanding, and normal expectations with regards to the occurrence of rare and highly influential events. Taleb describes both positive Black Swan’s such as the invention of the internet and personal computer as well as negative Black Swans such as the 2008 financial crisis. Key to Taleb’s characterization of the 2008 financial crisis as a Black Swan was the observation that modern financial statistical models were based on flawed and incomplete human assumptions that market prices followed normal, predictable patterns. These models were proven completely useless in predicting the volatility in prices observed during the crisis. Befuddled traders watched as price movements that, according to the models, were only supposed to happen once every couple million years happened repeatedly over the course of a few days.

The “percentages” Rodgers refers to in the opening quote to this piece harkens to Hughes’ conclusions that goals were scored according to a predictable probability distribution which was best served by blasting the ball into the opponent’s box as often as possible. This conclusion demanded that a team play no more than 5 passes before attempting a shot at goal.  The result of the “misguided attacking strategy” of keeping the ball more than 5 passes, according to Hughes, was a system far inferior to one that adhered to his stated ideologies.

The prominence of possession football, most recently demonstrated by F.C. Barcelona/Spain but also displayed throughout the evolution of the game by teams from Holland, Brazil, Argentina and the Liverpool/Nottingham Forest teams of the late 70s/early 80s defies Hughes’ simplistic and flawed conclusions. The fundamental flaw of Hughes’ theories is summarized by former England manager Graham Taylor, whose Watford teams enjoyed domestic success during the 80s through direct tactics but stumbled against more organized and possession oriented European teams: “When you gave the ball away, they didn’t give it back to you.”

The simplicity and selectivity (Hughes appears to have inexplicably excluded statistical observances that did not serve his ultimate conclusions) of Hughes’ analyses failed to account for the occurrence of something that defies normal expectations of limited past observations. Yes, a team like Watford could achieve rapid promotion and domestic success using Hughesian methods. But once they faced European competition that could keep the ball and break pressure through possession far more effectively than the domestic competitions upon which Hughes’ methods were based, the models exploded and the past statistics were meaningless.

Swansea will not win the Premier League this season. But, they look safe to avoid relegation and have become the toast of England using tactics and personnel that many would quickly dismiss as a recipe for utter failure. They may not have the impact of a true Black Swan according to the strict definition of Taleb’s theory, but their emergence is a reminder of how limited perception and human cognitive biases affect what is considered possible and worth pursuing within human endeavors.  

Using Swansea as an example for development of U.S. Soccer and MLS, Swansea’s play is an inspiring example that organized possession play can be effective and entertaining at the highest level without players of the highest pedigree. Lack of philosophy, fear of the unknown, and the limitations imposed by human cognitive biases are the real impediments to developing an MLS Swansea, rather than some inherent inability of the U.S. to produce players that can play in a possession based system.

Of course, Swansea’s performances aren’t merely the result of Rodgers deciding he liked possession football better than the direct approach. Swansea’s play reflects proper instruction and preparation and players are selected according to the needs of the system.

Coaches like Caleb Porter and Claudio Reyna are developing the “software” to implement the possession style of play at high levels within U.S. Soccer. But they are a definite minority! Swansea has suffered several lopsided defeats that might cause some to abandon the “risky” possession tactics in favor of negative, long ball tactics. Similarly, Caleb Porter’s U-23s team lost 4-0 to the senior national team leading to immediate skepticism of his possession based system and its appropriateness for U.S. players.

Like the personal computer, the internet or Holland’s Total Football, which were the subject of many errors, flaws and missteps, the software that Caleb Porter and Brendan Rodgers are developing will take time to perfect and implement. Fear of failure and reversion to what is considered “normal” or status quo will stunt our development and growth as a footballing nation. We’d do well to learn from Swansea’s commitment to their ideals and philosophy as we continue to evolve our footballing identity.   

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Jan 27, 20120 notes
2. Reference Points

“Great clubs have had one thing in common throughout history, regardless of era and tactics. They owned the pitch and they owned the ball. That means when you have the ball, you dictate play and when you are defending, you control the space.” 

                                                                   -Arrigo Sacchi

It’s hard to argue with Sacchi’s conclusions regarding what defines the truly dominant teams in football’s history. The hard part, of course, is figuring out how to get to that point as a team. In the feedback loop of football analysis, we must ask ourselves: Where does the loop start? What is causing us to lack the skills and awareness necessary to succeed in the game? What can we do to change things?

These are the questions du jour and the feedback from the top is illuminating. A recent article in ESPN published responses from Bob Bradley, John Hackworth, Caleb Porter, Tab Ramos, Thomas Rongen, Sigi Schmid, and Earnie Stewart to the following prompt: 

“…[W]here the assembly line for domestic soccer talent is faltering, where it needs tinkering, and where wholesale changes are necessary.”

With the exception of U.S. U-23 Coach Caleb Porter, each respondent pointed to the black box combination of American youth soccer and the supposed cultural inferiorities of American soccer as compared to other countries like Holland as the primary causes for inability to compete at the highest levels. 

An excerpt from Porter’s response:

“The priority has to be development over winning. I think you can win and develop players, but in order to do that you have to have a philosophy. A process, an approach, or some kind of a method is the most important thing at younger age … [a]t the end of the day, it’s going to take a long-term vision and some sort of philosophy.”

Watching Porter’s Akron teams over the last couple of seasons, it is immediately evident that his teams have an identity and adhere to a philosophy. They possess the ball, press in unison, and have concerted movement off the ball. Akron players come from all over the U.S. (and a few internationally) from diverse youth backgrounds. After the 2010 season, Akron lost 8 players to the MLS draft including central midfielders Anthony Ampaipitakwong and Perry Kitchen, two of the focal points of the 2010 team’s style and success. Yet, despite the turnover and diversity of backgrounds Porter’s 2011 Akron team played the same style as the national champion 2010 team. Porter’s teams control games as Sacchi described, forcing teams to chase them by keeping possession of the ball through deliberate buildup play and controlling space to recover the ball quickly if possession is lost.  

Porter’s response to the ESPN interview question reflects his commitment to designing and cultivating a footballing system based on a coherent philosophy. If there is no philosophy, there is no context by which to assess whether a player is “good,” or to separate the signal from the noise of what player qualities will serve the team’s collective goals. The philosophy starts the loop of player and team development and identification, not the other way around.

Of course, every philosophy and system is complex and has multiple subparts that must undergo detailed refinement in order to adapt successfully to changing opponents and playing styles. Some of this can be rehearsed in practice and some must be improvised during play. The ability to identify, refine, and implement these subparts is what separates the world’s best from the mediocre. While the big picture philosophy (i.e. possession v. counter-attack) is important, it is meaningless unless a philosophy’s granular details can be conveyed to players and rehearsed into memory. At this level is where a player must absorb the “rules” and reference points of the game in order to make good decisions on the field. 

The following reference points provide critical information each player should synthesize continually during a game to inform their own decisions: location of space, location of teammates, location of opponents, the goal, and the ball. An appropriate interpretation of these reference points provides a player with a clear map of the field and lays the groundwork for making critical decisions at speed. Of course, the details of interpretation are critical! Here are some interpretive suggestions to consider in relation to the details of each reference point. :

Location of space: With the ball, the entire field should be utilized. Seeking out space and identifying location of teammates when choosing movements is necessary to create and exploit space effectively. This places emphasis on the ability to control the ball instantly and play accurate, appropriately weighted passes as opposed to ability to routinely dribble past players. More space leads to more time on the ball and balanced spacing forces the opponent to cover more ground to defend. 

Lack of proper spacing is a significant contributor to breakdown of passing sequence for many American teams, particularly with regards to centerback spacing. Akron’s centerbacks are instructed to drop deep and wide when in possession in order to give their midfielders more room to operate and provide a drop pass outlet if the move going forward isn’t on. This expands the playing area and forces the opponent to cover more ground to recover the ball, particularly when an outside back or central midfielder is in posession. Unfortunately, this isn’t something that is demanded of most MLS centerbacks. Instead, you’ll see lack of movement or crowding of the midfielders when MLS teams have the ball in the back line. Of course, Barcelona are a great reference point for how this is done properly, as the video below demonstrates. 

The location of space has obvious relationships with the location of teammates and opponents and can change based on formations or opponents tactics. “Parking the bus” by crowding 10 players between the 18 and the half line is a common response to teams that are comfortable in possession and look to expand the playing area. This tactic requires players to to work in tighter spaces and make quicker decisions in response to the congestion in the opponents third of the field. 

Location and movement of teammates: Identifying location and distances of teammates allows a player to make decisions quickly under pressure after they have moved into space. Further, players should avoid crowding spaces where teammates are already located. Balanced deployment of players without the ball forces opponents to defend accordingly i.e. it’s easier for an opponent to defend 2 players if they are passing 5 feet apart. It’s not possible for one defender to defend the same 2 players if they are passing 15-30 feet apart. 

Balanced spacing and phased forward movement in unison also provides a risk mitigant by ensuring that a team doesn’t get “stretched out” when building possession towards the opponent’s goal. The distances between the forward, midfield, and defensive “lines” is important. If the forwards or midfielders leave behind the defenders by rushing towards goal, gaps between the lines occur which can be exploited if possession is lost. 

This concept has similar implications for horizontal movement and specific positional play. Sergio Busquets, FC Barcelona’s holding midfielder/volante is trained to perfection to recognize where he needs to be to balance out the attack and mitigate for risk in case possession is lost. He is ridiculed for not being a dynamic “box-to-box” type player by many in the English and American press. This is nonsense, Busquets’ movement and positioning is a function of Barcelona’s entire system. If Busquets’ moves too far right-left-forward-back this limits his playing options after receiving (the crowding problem) and creates balance distortion that can be fatal if FCB loses possession. This is what Busquets has been trained to do, not an indictment of his abilities. 

Location and movement of opponents: When a player is in possession or about to receive a pass, the importance of this reference point is fairly obvious. Location of the opponent will likely determine how much pressure will exist and what a player’s distribution options will be once he receives the ball. 

A somewhat counterintuitive aspect of this point is that sometimes being surrounded by opponents is a good thing. If you’re in a wing position without the ball surrounded by two or three opponents should you try to “get open” for a pass by moving to another location on the field? If your spacing with your teammates is appropriate the answer is most likely no! The fact that you’re double or triple covered means that there are vast amounts of space open somewhere else on the field for your team to exploit due to the opponent’s woeful lack of balance. 

Location and movement of the ball: The location of the ball can be a seductively illusive data point. When we’re closer to the ball, we feel more likely to receive it. Does that mean that everyone should move closer to the ball? Doing so would likely destroy the space and options you have to work with after receiving the ball. We’d be playing bunch ball like we did as kids!

The bunch ball idea seems like it should be a relic of soccer at the youngest ages, but the negative effects of ball crowding are on display in plenty of professional games! Getting the ball by moving closer isn’t enough. The systemic context of a movement must be evaluated. That’s why you see often see Xavi or Iniesta backing up into space when the ball is being moved up the field rather than impatiently “checking” towards their teammate with the ball. Just getting the ball at your feet isn’t enough to be effective. The sequence and context must constantly be observed and synthesized. 

The distinction is between focusing on getting where the ball needs to go based on the reference points described above, as opposed to where the ball is.

Location of the Goal:  Scoring goals is obviously the means by which a team wins a game. However, creating goal scoring opportunities is far more complex than directing a team’s attention towards constant advancement towards the goal. 

Goal location becomes more important as a team advances up the field in that playing the ball more centrally (where the goal is located) increases a team’s options for playing towards goal. If a team is in possession in the opponents third, their attacking options are limited to crosses. In contrast, if a team has the ball in centrally in the opponent’s third, the team can shoot, chip or play diagonally through the opponents defense. 

Mutual understanding and interpretation of these data points (and I’m sure there are plenty of nuances I’m missing) help serve as the building blocks for producing a team that can dominate possession and control a game. It requires collective commitment and humility to understand how each part works and is important to the success of the system. This video analysis of FC Barcelona’s collective movement and spacing is a great display of these concepts (the whole video is great; the spacing analysis starts at around 6:00): 

http://www.youtube.com/user/allasFCB2#p/search/0/I6A_K8oWqfk

Caleb Porter’s successful implementation of a philosophy in the image of the world’s best at Akron and the recent U-23 camps is an inspirational point of pride for U.S. Soccer. Porter’s U-23 team recently scrimmaged the senior national team, and reports indicate that he has been able to implement the same cohesive style with the U-23s as his Akron teams, dominating possession and forcing the senior national to chase the game. Of course, Porter is one person within the infrastructure of U.S. Soccer. Skepticism of Porter’s methods is unavoidable and change will not come easy. The responses of the other 6 coaches to the ESPN prompt are reminders of why we’ve been stuck in neutral. 

Former U.S. National Team Coach Bob Bradley:  “It still comes down to how many good people get with clubs and are working with young kids to make sure things are done right.”

Former U-20 National Team Coach Tomas Rongen:  “I got a lot of players on the U-20 national team that were technically very deficient, and they were some of the best players in the country.”

Philadelphia Union Youth Coordinator John Hackworth: “Ours is a very result-oriented culture — specifically parents of young children — and the only way they can measure whether their child is doing something good is whether they won on a Saturday. And that’s the wrong way to look at how to become a really good soccer player.”

These statements are passive 10,000 foot level shirks that do not add anything to the discourse. Yes, there are flaws in the incentives and infrastructure currently in place. Anyone who has come in the slightest contact with U.S. Soccer as a player or coach can identify that immediately. But these guys are the pros, right? Here’s an opportunity to say something meaningful, specific, and insightful about deficiencies in our Soccer DNA that people can learn from.  Instead they take the easy way out and provide some pseudo-intellectual cop out story about how the “assembly line” just isn’t producing players that are good enough for these coaches to do anything when they come into contact with them. 

Nonsense. Caleb Porter was the only respondent to step up and provide meaningful specifics. His approach should be embraced as an initiator of evolution within U.S. Soccer. 

Jan 23, 20120 notes
Fractal Football

Fractal geometry was developed by the mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot as a means to overcome the functional limitations of Euclidean geometry. While Euclidean Geometry is modeled on objects with smooth lines and uniform angles (triangles, squares, circles), Mandelbrot observed that physical objects found in nature do not adhere to Euclidean forms and the mathematical rules used to measure them:

“Clouds are not spheres, mountains are not cones, coastlines are not circles, and bark is not smooth, nor does lightning travel in a straight line.” 

For centuries mathematical and scientific study dismissed the “roughness” of natural objects as irregular distractions from idealized shapes. The seductively tidy and finite mathematical tools which followed from Euclidean theory sufficed as a sufficient proxy of the non-Euclidean natural world despite the obvious flaws and inaccuracies produced by reliance on Euclidean models. The world was made to fit the models, rather than designing models to fit the world (an unfortunate analog to the development of economics/financial markets models).

Rejecting Euclidean theory as an unrealistic set of abstractions, Mandelbrot developed fractal geometry to approximate the organic processes by which complex natural phenomena such as clouds, coastlines, or human lungs occur. The key to this process is identifying the repeating patterns by which the parts grow and are shaped to become the whole.

Fractal theory starts small identifying the patterns by which simple parts become a more complex whole. As a result of this analytical approach and the accurate outcomes it has led to, fractals and fractal geometry have influenced diverse scientific and social disciplines from physics to graphic design. Mandelbrot himself incorporated fractals as the central means to analyze financial markets and economic activity in his influential book The Misbehavior of Markets. 

The lessons of fractal geometry and its applications have significant relevance to football philosophy and analysis. A team’s overall performance is the result of thousands of small scale patterns and individual decisions during the course of a game. The patterns of individual decisions combine throughout the course of a game to create the identifying markers of a team as whole—the style of play by which a team can gain (or lose) control of a game. 

Whether the philosophy is catenaccio or tiki-taka, a manager must instill a philosophy to guide the thousands, if not millions, of small scale patterns and interactions occurring at an individual level during every game. A football team is a social system requiring careful cultivation and concerted understanding of the workings of each of its parts.  Without a philosophy to define the “rules” for each individual member of the team to execute, the system will become vulnerable to fragility and failure. 

Not all systems and philosophies are equal. Barcelona’s possession based tiki-taka/total football philosophy has fostered long periods of domination and success. In comparison, the legacy of England’s direct approach and bizarre repulsion of ball possession has been consistent mediocrity. Refinement and continued adaptation are necessary to progress.

Like Mandelbrot, the world’s football scientists such as Rinus Michels, Johann Cruyff, Cesar Luis Menotti, and Pep Guardiola have challenged established orthodoxies and conventional wisdom to fuel the evolution of their craft. Their contributions have evolved the identification of the most effective systems/rules and the individual qualities necessary to implement them. 

The United States struggles to identify which individual qualities contribute the parts that can be shaped and refined to make up a robust whole. Often, players are evaluated and described in terms that suggests physical one on one conflicts are the interactions that determine which team will control a game. Speed, height, and physical power are emphasized. Pattern recognition, technical ability, and tactical awareness remain disturbingly absent from most American analyses.  

The latter factors are far more important to creating a team system that can impose its philosophy on opponents to achieve consistent dominance. Individual recognition of situational and spatial context as it relates to serving a team’s shared philosophical and tactical ideas is paramount. Consistent execution of game actions at speed is built on this awareness. This quality defies conventional measurement and association with transparent athletic qualities like running speed and measured strength, yet its importance is heralded universally by elite players and coaches of the game.  

These qualities have been historically overlooked in the United States in favor of more easily describable “athletic” factors or statistics devoid of contextual analysis. It is foolish and counterproductive for us to diminish their importance any longer.  Barcelona’s renaissance has refocused the discussion on what is important in building an effective soccer team and system. We should not allow this moment to pass without strengthening the ideals and dismissing the obsolete within United States soccer culture. The old models and established rules must be challenged and replaced by a more robust set of ideas and expectations.  

More to follow…

Jan 13, 20120 notes
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